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ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE:  
ELDRED v. ASHCROFT GETS IT RIGHT 
CRAIG W. DALLON* 
In Eldred v. Ashcroft1 the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality 
of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 (the “CTEA”)2 and 
was called upon to construe the scope of power granted to Congress by Article 
I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution (the “Copyright Clause”).3  Many 
scholars were surprised that the Court had granted certiorari in the case.4  The 
case generated no fewer than thirty-four amicus curiae briefs from interest 
groups and individuals on both sides of the case,5 and spawned numerous law 
review articles while it was pending.6 
Many scholars and advocates for the public domain hoped that the 
Supreme Court in Eldred would find in the Copyright Clause meaningful 
limitations on the power of Congress to confer financial benefits on copyright 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Creighton University School of Law.  I wish to thank Joshua 
Willmott and Natalie Polzer for their research assistance with this article. 
 1. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).  The case was argued on October 9, 2002, and decided January 15, 
2003.  Id. 
 2. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827. 
 3. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries”). 
 4. This may be putting it mildly.  Professor Hugh C. Hansen stated: “I do not know anyone 
on either side of the debate who thought that certiorari would be granted.  When the Court 
granted certiorari, people were dumbstruck.”  Symposium: Panel II, Mickey Mice? Potential 
Ramifications of Eldred v. Ashcroft, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 771, 776–
77 (2003). 
 5. See U.S. Supreme Court docket No. 01-618, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/01-
618.htm (listing briefs).  This number does not include the amicus briefs filed in connection with 
the petition for certiorari.  See id. 
 6. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Dubious Constitutionality of the Copyright Term 
Extension Act, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 123 (2002); Orrin G. Hatch & Thomas R. Lee, “To Promote 
the Progress of Science”: The Copyright Clause and Congress’s Power to Extend Copyrights, 16 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2002); Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-monopoly Origins of the 
Patent and Copyright Clause, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 675 (2002); Symposium: Panel II, 
supra note 4. 
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holders without providing any corresponding benefit to the public.7  The 
petitioners and others hoped for a bold, landscape-altering decision.  They did 
not get it.  Instead, the Court afforded Congress substantial discretion in 
adopting copyright legislation and refused to find significant limits in the “To 
promote the Progress of Science” or “for limited Times” language of the 
clause. 
Since Eldred, some scholars have decried what they perceive as the 
Court’s abrogation of its constitutional role to give meaning to the Copyright 
Clause and operate as an effective check on the legislative branch.8  Others 
believe that the Court’s holding was correct.9  This Article takes the position 
that, regardless of the merits of the CTEA itself,10 the Court correctly 
determined that Congress had the power to enact the CTEA, including the 
retroactive extension of the term for existing copyrights.  The Framers and 
ratifiers of the Constitution likely did not intend for the Copyright Clause to be 
construed to impose the limits urged by opponents of the CTEA, nor would 
they have viewed the Copyright Clause as a vehicle for the courts to strike 
down copyright legislation retroactively extending copyright terms.  This 
Article will evaluate Eldred using originalist and textualist approaches to 
constitutional interpretation.11 
Part I of this Article will discuss the rationale and holding of Eldred.  Part 
II will consider the meaning of the text of the Copyright Clause and suggest 
that the clause is first and foremost a grant of power to establish an effective 
copyright system with only modest limits on the exercise of congressional 
 
 7. See Pamela Samuelson, The Constitutional Law of Intellectual Property After Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 547, 548 (2003) (noting “substantial consensus” among 
intellectual property scholars that CTEA is unconstitutional). 
 8. See, e.g., Edward C. Walterscheid, Musings on the Copyright Power: A Critique of 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 309 (2004); William Patry, The United States and 
International Copyright Law: From Berne to Eldred, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 749, 755–58 (2003); L. 
Ray Patterson, What’s Wrong with Eldred? An Essay on Copyright Jurisprudence, 10 J. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 345, 349 (2003). 
 9. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Essay, Eldred and Lochner: 
Copyright Term Extension and Intellectual Property As Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 
2331 (2003). 
 10. On balance, the CTEA was bad policy; it served the private interests of a few copyright 
holders to the detriment of the public.  See Craig W. Dallon, The Problem with Congress and 
Copyright Law: Forgetting the Past and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
365 (2004) (arguing that the CTEA is inconsistent with the historical purposes of copyright 
protection and elevated the interest of a few copyright holders above the public interest). 
 11. The Eldred petitioners and the Court both used these modes of interpretation.  See Eldred 
v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199 (2003) (relying upon “[t]ext, history, and precedent” in its 
analysis); Brief for Petitioners at 14, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618) 
(stating that argument was based on the “text, structure and original meaning of the Copyright 
Clause”).  For a discussion of the modalities of interpretation, see PHILIP BOBBITT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 9–38 (1982). 
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power.  Part III will suggest that limited judicial review for constitutionality of 
copyright enactments is consistent with Supreme Court precedent and the 
intention of the Framers.  Part IV will identify problems with the Eldred 
decision and suggest that the Court unnecessarily placed greater emphasis on 
private interests of copyright holders at the expense of the public interest.  It 
will also disagree with the Court’s analysis of the “quid pro quo” argument and 
will question the Court’s historical rationale.  Part V will conclude that the 
Supreme Court appropriately affirmed Congress’s power to enact the CTEA. 
I.  THE HOLDING AND RATIONALE OF ELDRED V. ASHCROFT 
Eldred v. Ashcroft,12 for the first time before the Supreme Court, squarely 
presented an issue concerning the constitutionality of copyright terms.  In 
earlier decisions the Supreme Court had considered whether works qualified 
for copyright protection13 and whether works had passed into the public 
domain,14 but Eldred was the first case to question the authority of Congress to 
extend copyright terms. 
In Eldred, the petitioners argued that the CTEA, enacted in 1998, was 
unconstitutional.  The CTEA extended the terms of existing and future 
copyrights by twenty years.  Prior to the CTEA, under the Copyright Act of 
1976 (the “1976 Act”), generally the term for copyrights was the life of the 
author plus fifty years.15  For works made for hire, anonymous works, and 
pseudonymous works, the term was the earlier of seventy-five years from the 
year of its first publication or one hundred years from its creation.  The CTEA 
extended those copyright terms by twenty years to the life of the author plus 
seventy years, or for works made for hire, anonymous works, and 
pseudonymous works, the earlier of ninety-five years from publication or one 
hundred twenty years from creation.16 
 
 12. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 13. E.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (holding circus 
advertisements subject to copyright protection); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 
U.S. 53 (1884) (holding photograph qualified for copyright protection); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 
U.S. 591 (1834) (holding strict conformance with statute required for copyright protection). 
 14. See Am. Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284 (1907) (holding public display of 
painting at exhibit did not constitute general publication placing work beyond reach of copyright 
protection); Mifflin v. Dutton, 190 U.S. 265 (1903) (holding Harriet Beecher Stowe’s work, the 
“Minister’s Wooing,” had passed into the public domain for failure to satisfy the notice 
requirement).  For leading circuit court decisions, see, e.g., Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. 
v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 1999) (deciding whether Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s “I 
Have a Dream” speech passed into the public domain); Hasbro Bradley, Inc. v. Sparkle Toys, 
Inc., 780 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1985) (deciding whether failure to place required copyright notice on 
toys could be cured to afford copyright protection). 
 15. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193 (citing Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 
2541). 
 16. Id. 
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The petitioners in the lower courts argued that the CTEA was 
unconstitutional as it concerned term extensions for both existing and future 
copyrights.17  Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners limited their argument 
to the constitutionality of the extension of existing copyrights (retroactive term 
extensions); they did not challenge the constitutionality of copyright term 
extension for future works (prospective term extensions).18  The petitioners 
argued that under an intermediate scrutiny analysis, copyright extension 
violated the First Amendment.19  The petitioners’ other arguments spoke 
directly to the text and meaning of the Copyright Clause itself; they claimed 
that the CTEA violated the “limited Times” requirement because retroactive 
extension was not “limited,” did not “promote the Progress of Science,” and 
violated an implied quid pro quo requirement.20  This Article will focus on the 
Copyright Clause issues and will only briefly summarize the First Amendment 
argument. 
The First Amendment argument did not get much traction at any level of 
the litigation.21  The district court spent barely three sentences rejecting the 
argument, relying upon District of Columbia Circuit precedent holding that 
“there are no First Amendment rights to use the copyrighted works of 
others.”22  The argument received greater attention in the circuit court decision, 
but an equally strong rebuke.  The Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit held that prior precedents stood “as insuperable bars” to 
plaintiffs’ argument, and reaffirmed its holding that “copyrights are 
categorically immune from challenges under the First Amendment.”23  The 
Court of Appeals emphasized that the copyright doctrines of the 
idea/expression dichotomy and fair use already afford adequate protection for 
free speech.24 
 
 17. See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2001), aff’d sub nom. Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 18. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218 n.23 (2003).  “Petitioners originally framed [the First 
Amendment] argument as implicating the CTEA’s extension of both existing and future 
copyrights,” but narrowed the argument on appeal to the Supreme Court.  Id.; see also id. at 198 
(stating questions for which certiorari was granted). 
 19. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 11, at 11. 
 20. Id. at 10. 
 21. William Patry is of the view that “[i]n truth, there never was a claimed First Amendment 
violation,” but rather an effort to get the Court to apply First Amendment strict scrutiny to an 
alleged Copyright Clause violation.  Patry, supra note 8, at 758. 
 22. Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), 
aff’d sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 23. Eldred, 239 F.3d at 375. 
 24. Id. at 376. 
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Like the lower courts, the Supreme Court did not dwell long on the First 
Amendment argument.25  The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of 
Appeals’ view that copyright law’s “built-in First Amendment 
accommodations,” namely the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use, already 
afford adequate protection for First Amendment considerations26 and refused 
to impose heightened scrutiny on the CTEA.27  The Supreme Court found 
significant that the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment were both 
adopted close in time, indicating that the Framers saw these two constitutional 
provisions as compatible.28  The Court held that the First Amendment “bears 
less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people’s speeches.”29  
The Court, however, did disavow the circuit court’s overly broad statement 
that copyrights were “categorically immune from challenges under the First 
Amendment.”30 
The Court also rejected the petitioners’ Copyright Clause claims.  These 
claims focused on the “limited Times” language and the “To promote the 
Progress of Science” language.31  The heart of the petitioners’ argument was 
that Congress exceeded its constitutionally granted authority under the 
Copyright Clause when it enacted retroactive copyright term extensions. 
The petitioners argued that the CTEA retroactive extension of the term of 
existing copyrights violated the constitutional requirement that copyrights be 
granted for limited times.32  Petitioners argued that the CTEA retroactive 
extension was, in essence, a step toward perpetual copyright.33  The Court 
responded that a copyright term for the life of the author plus seventy years is a 
copyright for a limited time (petitioners essentially conceded as much).34  The 
Court looked to Constitution-era dictionary definitions of the word “limited” 
 
 25. The Court handled the analysis of the First Amendment argument in six paragraphs 
covering about three pages.  See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218–21.  By contrast, the Copyright Clause 
analysis covered about nineteen pages.  See id. at 199–218. 
 26. Id. at 219. 
 27. Id. at 218–19. 
 28. Id. at 219; cf. 16 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 379, 386 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1986) [hereinafter 16 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF RATIFICATION] (Norfolk & Portsmouth J., by “Marcus” (James Iredell), dated Mar. 
12, 1788).  James Iredell, later Justice of the Supreme Court, arguing for ratification of the 
Constitution, wrote that the Copyright Clause did not impede liberty of the press; “surely such an 
encouragement to genius is no restraint on the liberty of the press.”  Id. 
 29. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 197. 
 32. Id. at 208. 
 33. Id.; Brief for Petitioners, supra note 11, at 18–19. 
 34. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199; see also Brief for Petitioners, supra note 11, at 14 (arguing that 
“[w]hether 50 years is enough, or 70 years too much, is not a judgment meet for this Court”); id. 
(stating that “[t]he line between prospective and retrospective extensions is a clear one”) 
(emphases added). 
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and easily found that the extended term continued to be limited—“‘confine[d] 
within certain bounds,’ ‘restrain[ed],’ or ‘circumscribe[d].’”35  Nothing in the 
text of the CTEA creates a perpetual copyright.36  Moreover, the Court found 
no intention by Congress to create perpetual copyrights.37  Given that a 
copyright in a future work lasting for the life of the author plus seventy years is 
for a limited time, it is a small step—if a step at all—to find that extending the 
term of an existing copyright resulting in the same term is a term for a limited 
time. 
As confirmation of no violation of the limited times requirement, the Court 
relied heavily upon the historical practice of various congresses in granting 
retroactive copyright extensions.  “History reveals an unbroken congressional 
practice of granting to authors of works with existing copyrights the benefit of 
term extensions so that all under copyright protection will be governed 
evenhandedly under the same regime.”38  The Court also pointed to a history of 
retroactive patent extensions and decisions approving such extensions as 
evidence that the Copyright Clause in no way forecloses retroactive 
extensions.39  Article I, section 8, clause 8, referred to here as the Copyright 
Clause, is also sometimes referred to as the Intellectual Property Clause or the 
Patent Clause40 because this same clause also authorizes Congress to extend 
patent protection.41 
The Court also rejected the petitioners’ claim that the extension failed to 
promote the progress of science.  The Court emphasized that Congress enjoys 
broad discretion in determining how best to promote the progress of science by 
affording copyright protection.42  The Court found that the CTEA promoted 
the progress of science and satisfied the rational basis test by harmonizing 
United States copyright law with European Union (EU) copyright law and 
providing greater incentives for creation and dissemination of works in the 
United States.43  The Court rejected the argument that the retroactive extension 
failed to satisfy a perceived constitutionally mandated quid pro quo 
 
 35. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199 (alterations in original) (quoting S. JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF 
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (7th ed. 1785)). 
 36. Id. at 209 n.16.  “[Justice Breyer] does not identify any statement in the statutory text 
that installs a perpetual copyright for there is none.”  Id. 
 37. Id. at 199–200, 209. 
 38. Id. at 200. 
 39. Id. at 201–04. 
 40. See, e.g., TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 35 (2001) (not 
reaching the “Patent Clause” issue); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. 
Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 635–37, 636 n.4 (1999) (discussing and quoting the “Patent Clause”); United 
States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp.2d 1111, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (referring to the “Intellectual 
Property Clause”). 
 41. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 201. 
 42. Id. at 212–13. 
 43. Id. at 205–07. 
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exchange—a copyright in exchange for creation of a work.44  The Court 
accepted, for argument’s sake, the contention that a quid pro quo requirement 
existed, but found that authors created their works in exchange for copyright 
protection with an expectation that they would also be entitled to future 
copyright extensions.45 
II.  THE MEANING OF THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE: FOREMOST, A GRANT OF 
AUTHORITY 
A. Empowering Congress 
In Eldred, the Court allowed Congress substantial deference to define the 
contours of copyright protection.  “As we read the Framers’ instruction, the 
Copyright Clause empowers Congress to determine the intellectual property 
regimes that, overall, in that body’s judgment, will serve the ends of the 
Clause.”46  The Court, recognizing its role, refused to “second-guess” 
Congress.47  The Court’s deference and the outcome in Eldred comport with 
the language and intent of the Copyright Clause; the Clause, above all, was 
intended to grant Congress authority to create a copyright scheme and not to 
impose limits upon copyright interests. 
Any constitutional analysis must begin with the language of the 
Constitution itself.  The Copyright Clause states that Congress has the power to 
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries . . . .”48  Little is known about the drafting of the 
precise language of the Copyright Clause.  In the Constitutional Convention 
there was no recorded discussion of the meaning of the clause; it was adopted 
unanimously and without controversy. 49  Proposed language for the clause was 
introduced at the Constitutional Convention by both James Madison and 
Charles Pinckney.50  Copyright, however, was already a familiar concept to the 
Framers.  The famous English copyright statute, the Statute of Anne of 1710,51 
was well known to the Framers.52  Moreover, the Continental Congress in 1783 
 
 44. Id. at 214–15. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222. 
 47. Id. 
 48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 49. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 505–15 (Max Farrand ed., 
rev. ed in four vols., 1966) [hereinafter 2 CONVENTION RECORDS]. 
 50. Id. at 324–25. 
 51. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). 
 52. The preamble to the Copyright Act of 1790 clearly drew upon the language of the 
preamble of the Statute of Anne of 1710.  See 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN 
LAW 307 (1st ed. 1826) (noting that the Copyright Act of 1790 was taken generally from the 
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passed a resolution encouraging the states to adopt copyright laws.53  James 
Madison was one of the three members of the committee in the Continental 
Congress who reported on the copyright resolution as it was adopted.54  
Between 1783 and 1786, all the states except Delaware passed their own 
respective copyright laws.55 
The Copyright Clause is unambiguously a grant of power.  The text of the 
clause communicates the Framers’ intent to give Congress the power to 
provide protection to authors for their writings (and inventors for their 
discoveries). This understanding of the clause is confirmed by 
contemporaneous events and statements.  Just prior to the Constitutional 
Convention, Madison complained that one of the problems with the 
government under the Articles of Confederation was the “want of uniformity in 
the laws concerning naturalization & literary property.”56  In May 1783, when 
Congress passed its resolution on copyright protection, it did not have the 
power to impose a national copyright law, but instead was reduced to 
“recommend[] to the several states, to secure to the authors or publishers of 
any new books not hitherto printed . . . the copy right of such books.”57 
During the debates for ratification of the Constitution, the Framers and 
ratifiers echoed the same theme—that the individual states were incapable of 
effectively protecting literary property.  Madison, in The Federalist No. 43, 
justified granting the power to protect authors and inventors under the 
Copyright and Patent Clause by observing that “[t]he states cannot separately 
make effectual provision for either of the cases.”58  Prominent founder Thomas 
McKean,59 in debates over ratification before the Pennsylvania Convention, 
argued the same point: “[T]he power of securing to authors and inventors the 
 
Statute of Anne); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (noting that 
the Framers understood the nature of copyright and surely were aware of the then-recent 
controversy in England concerning the Statute of Anne and common law copyrights). 
 53. 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 326–27 (Gaillard Hunt 
ed., 1922) (reporting text of resolution) [hereinafter 24 JOURNALS]. 
 54. Id. at 326. 
 55. See COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS: LAWS PASSED IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1783 
RELATING TO COPYRIGHT 21 (Copyright Office ed., Bulletin No. 3, rev. 1963) [hereinafter 
COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS]. 
 56. Observations by J.M., II MADISON PAPERS 109, vol. XII, 53 (1787), reprinted in 4 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1786–
1870, at 126, 128 (1905). 
 57. 24 JOURNALS, supra note 53, at 326–27. 
 58. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 222 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James 
McClellan eds., Gideon ed. 2001). 
 59. Thomas McKean (also seen as M’Kean) was a signor of the Declaration of 
Independence, President of the Continental Congress, Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court, and Governor of Pennsylvania.  See BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONGRESS 1774–1996, 1490–91 (Joel D. Treese ed., 1997). 
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exclusive right to their writings and discoveries could only with effect be 
exercised by the Congress.”60  Roger Sherman, himself an important member 
of the Constitutional Convention and an active participant in the ratification 
debates in Connecticut, wrote in the Connecticut Courant that the new power 
vested in the United States “for promoting the progress of science,” among 
other powers, “appear[ed] to be necessary for the common benefit of the states 
and could not be effectually provided for by the particular states.”61 
The clause was not a reaction to existing monopolies,62 nor was it an effort 
to restrict or limit existing copyrights.  Instead, the clause was to make clear 
that the national government had the power to enact copyright (and patent) 
laws.  This purpose can be contrasted with the purpose behind the Statute of 
Anne, which was drafted with the dual purposes of allowing copyright 
protection but also limiting the Stationers’ book monopoly.63  Admittedly, the 
grant of authority does carry with it some implicit limitations on congressional 
power, but these limitations on their face and by design are modest as will 
appear below.64 
B. “To promote the Progress of Science” 
1. Phrase As Part of the Substantive Grant of Power 
Some commentators, in an effort to breathe life into what sometimes has 
been characterized as the “preambular” language of the Copyright Clause, have 
maintained that the language “To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts” is part of the power-granting language. 65  Judge Sentelle took this 
position in his dissent in the Court of Appeals decision in Eldred.66  Taking the 
argument a step further, this granting language imposes corresponding 
 
 60. 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 415 
(Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) [hereinafter 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RATIFICATION]. 
 61. 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 525 
(Merrill Jensen ed., 1978) [hereinafter 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RATIFICATION]. 
 62. See Thomas B. Nachbar, Constructing Copyright’s Mythology, 6 GREEN BAG 2d 37, 43–
44 (2002). 
 63. See Dallon, supra note 10, at 403–09 (discussing purposes of the Statute of Anne and 
efforts to limit Stationers’ monopoly). 
 64. See infra notes 215–65 and accompanying text. 
 65. Edward C. Walterscheid, The Preambular Argument: The Dubious Premise of Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 44 IDEA: THE J. OF LAW & TECH. 331, 332–34 (2004) (arguing that the “To promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts” language is a grant of power, not merely a preamble); 
Lawrence B. Solum, Congress’s Power to Promote the Progress of Science: Eldred v. Ashcroft, 
36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 22 (2002) (arguing that the “to promote” language is a grant of power 
and finding the argument that the clause consists of a preamble followed by a power grant 
“unsustainable”). 
 66. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 381 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (arguing that the Clause “is a grant 
of a power to promote progress”), aff’d sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
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limitations on congressional power.67  Under this view, Congress is 
empowered to legislate in the areas of copyrights and patents only if the 
particular legislation in some way promotes the progress of science or the 
useful arts. 
The “preamble” argument embraced by the court of appeals in Eldred was 
that the language “To promote the Progress of Science” was merely a 
statement of purpose and itself placed no substantive limit on Congress’s 
legislative power.68  The court of appeals claimed that the preambular language 
was not part of the substantive grant of power.69  The precedent the court of 
appeals relied upon, however, did not go so far.  In Schnapper v. Foley,70 relied 
upon by the court, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that 
the “purposive” or “introductory phrase” of the Copyright Clause did not 
constitute a substantive limit on Congress’s legislative power.71  It did not hold 
that the language was not part of the grant of power.  In fact, the Schnapper 
court cited Nimmer on Copyright for the proposition that the introductory 
phrase, rather than limiting Congress’s authority, “has for the most part tended 
to expand such authority.”72 
The Supreme Court, without expressly embracing or disavowing the 
preamble argument, acknowledged the circuit court’s position73 and the 
petitioners’ concession74 that the preamble was not a substantive limit on 
Congress’s power.  Instead of expressly rejecting the preamble argument, the 
Court found that the CTEA arguably did “promote[] the Progress of Science”75 
by harmonizing American copyright law with EU law and encouraging 
investment in restoration and public distribution of works.76 
The phrase “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” should 
be considered part of the granting language of the clause, but should neither be 
viewed as a general grant of authority to promote the progress of science by 
 
 67. See Walterscheid, supra note 65, at 359–60 (finding “the ‘to promote’ language of the 
Clause is more than merely a statement of purpose; it is both a general grant of power and a 
constitutional limitation on the authority granted to Congress with respect to patents and 
copyrights”). 
 68. See Eldred, 239 F.3d at 378. 
 69. Id. (stating that “the Court in Feist [Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 
499 U.S. 340 (1991)] never suggests that the preamble informs its interpretation of the 
substantive grant of power to the Congress”). 
 70. 667 F.2d 102 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 71. Id. at 111–12. 
 72. Id. at 111 (citing 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03(B)).  The latest edition of Nimmer on 
Copyright continues to hold to that view.  1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER 
ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[B] (2005). 
 73. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 197 (2003). 
 74. Id. at 211. 
 75. Id. at 213. 
 76. Id. at 205–07. 
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any means nor as a limitation on Congress’s copyright power.  The phrase 
could be considered “introductory” only in the sense that it is the opening or 
beginning phrase of the clause.77  That label in no way detracts from the legal 
significance of the phrase. Whether the phrase is fairly characterized as 
“preambular” is a closer call.  A preamble is defined as: 
1: an introductory part (as to a book, document): introduction, preface; specif : 
the introductory part of a statute . . . that states the reasons and intent of the 
law . . . or is used for other explanatory purposes  (as to recite facts knowledge 
of which is necessary to an understanding of the law or to define or limit the 
meanings of words used in the law) . . . .78 
The phrase does communicate the reasons and intent of the law, but it is not 
limited to an introductory or explanatory role.  The phrase on its face is an 
adjective phrase directly describing the power granted.  The phrase beginning 
“by securing,” in turn, modifies “to promote.”  The “to promote” phrase is 
language of the grant and not merely a preamble.79 
2. Power Limited to Creation of Copyright and Patent Schemes 
Finding that the “to promote . . .” phrase is not merely preambular does not 
suggest that the power granted by the clause extends beyond legislating in the 
areas of copyright and patent.  The clause, read in its entirety, identifies the 
means by which Congress may achieve its goals.  “The Congress shall have 
Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries; . . . .”80  The “by securing” phrase is specific and 
can only be read as limiting the “to promote” phrase.  Hence, the phrase 
authorizes Congress to promote the progress of science and useful arts 
pursuant to this clause only in the ways identified in the “by securing” 
phrase—by affording copyright and patent protection.81 
 
 77. See WEBSTER’S II: NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 582 (1995) (listing one definition of 
“introduce” as: “[t]o open or begin: PREFACE” and one definition of “introductory” as: “[s]erving 
to introduce”). 
 78. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE: 
UNABRIDGED 1783 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 1993) (1961). 
 79. See Solum, supra note 65, at 21–25 (making strong case that the phrase is part of the 
grant); Walterscheid, supra note 65, at 358–78 (rejecting characterization of the phrase as merely 
meaningless preamble). 
 80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 81. This Article does not suggest that by limiting the “To promote the Progress of Science” 
phrase the Copyright Clause negates Congress’s power to promote the progress of science in 
other ways pursuant to other powers granted by the Constitution such as the Commerce Clause, 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, or the General Welfare Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  
Compare Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 272 (2004) (arguing that the Intellectual Property Clause does not act as a limitation on 
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Edward Walterscheid, who has done excellent work in the area of the 
history of the Copyright Clause, disagrees.  He reads the “by securing” phrase 
“as an explanation of, rather than a limitation on, the ‘to promote’ language.”82  
He suggests that the clause authorizes Congress to promote the progress of 
science and useful arts in ways other than through copyright and patent 
protection.83  If this view is correct, then the Eldred petitioners were right—
any legislation in the area of copyright must first and foremost promote the 
progress of science.  This interpretation of the Copyright Clause, however, is 
contrary to the plain meaning of the text of the clause.84  A deviation from the 
constitutional text arguably might be forgiven if compelling evidence indicated 
that the Framers in fact intended something other than what they said (and the 
ratifiers understood that meaning), but the historical record is devoid of such 
evidence. 
Walterscheid claims support in original intent of the clause and makes 
three points.85  First, there is little evidence in the contemporaneous record to 
support the plain meaning interpretation of the clause.86  Second, other means 
for promoting the progress of science and useful arts were known at the time of 
the Federal Constitutional Convention.87  Third, “indirect evidence” suggests 
that Washington and Hamilton interpreted the Copyright Clause to grant more 
than the power to protect copyrights and patents.88 
Given that there is scarce evidence expressing any contemporaneous views 
of the Framers of the Copyright Clause, it comes as no surprise that there is 
little evidence for any particular view.  What evidence there is, however, 
strongly suggests that, concerning the clause, the Framers and ratifiers were 
focused exclusively on the copyright and patent powers.  The Federalist’s 
comments on the Copyright Clause, brief though they may have been, indicate 
that the Framers understood that the purpose of the clause was to empower 
Congress to create a national copyright system and a national patent system.  
Madison wrote: 
 
other Article I powers), with Walterscheid, supra note 65, at 352–54 (discussing the view that the 
Copyright Clause limits other Article I powers). 
 82. Walterscheid, supra note 65, at 356. 
 83. Id. at 347–48 (noting that if the “by securing” phrase is viewed as explanation, then the 
clause empowers Congress to promote the progress of science and useful arts by a wide variety of 
means, not merely by copyrights and patents); see also id. at 351–52, 357 (arguing for broad 
interpretation); Edward C. Walterscheid, Conforming the General Welfare Clause and the 
Intellectual Property Clause, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 87, 94–97 (1999) (arguing for broad 
interpretation). 
 84. Walterscheid faults the drafting of the clause—“the Framers unartfully phrased it.”  
Walterscheid, supra note 65, at 357. 
 85. Id. at 351–52. 
 86. Id. at 351. 
 87. Id. at 351 n.106. 
 88. Id. at 351–52. 
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The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned.  The copy-right of 
authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain, to be a right at common 
law.  The right to useful inventions, seems with equal reason to belong to the 
inventors.  The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of 
individuals.89 
There is no word or hint of a broader power to promote the progress of science 
or useful arts in ways other than through copyrights or patents.  If the clause 
were intended to have such a broad sweep, one would have expected 
discussion or explanation supporting a broad meaning. 
Even if the language of the Copyright Clause was “unartfully” drafted,90 it 
likely was understood and ratified as written.91  There are few recorded 
references to the Copyright Clause during the ratification debates, but what 
references there are support a narrow view of the clause limited to copyright 
and patent legislation.  During the ratification debates in Connecticut in 1788, 
Roger Sherman, himself an important Framer of the Constitution,92 publicly 
wrote that one of the new powers vested in the United States was “for 
promoting the progress of science in the mode therein pointed out.”93  In the 
ratification debates before the Pennsylvania convention, Thomas McKean’s 
only reference to the Copyright Clause focused on “the power of securing to 
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their writings and discoveries” with 
no reference to a broader power.94 
At the Constitutional Convention, Madison initially proposed the powers 
“To secure to literary authors their copyrights for a limited time,” “To establish 
an University,” and “To encourage by premiums & provisions, the 
 
 89. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 58, at 222 (James Madison). 
 90. See supra note 84. 
 91. Justice Story aptly put it: 
Nothing but the text itself was adopted by the people.  And it would certainly be a most 
extravagant doctrine to give to any commentary then made, and, a fortiori, to any 
commentary since made under a very different posture of feeling and opinion, an 
authority, which should operate an absolute limit upon the text, or should supersede its 
natural and just interpretation. 
1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES  § 406 (1833). 
 92. Sherman actively participated in the debates at the Constitutional Convention and was a 
member, along with Madison, of the Committee of Eleven, which worked on the language of the 
Copyright Clause and reported it to the Convention for approval.  See 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, 
supra note 49, at 473, 481, 505, 508–09. 
 93. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RATIFICATION, supra note 61, at 525 (emphasis added).  
This view appears to be consistent with Sherman’s views in 1789 when, as a member of 
Congress, he opposed funding a scientific voyage suggesting that protection for petitioner’s 
discovery or invention was as far as Congress should go—“as far as warranted by the 
Constitution.”  10 DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 213 (Charlene Bangs Bickford 
et al. eds., 1992). 
 94. 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RATIFICATION, supra note 60, at 415. 
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advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries.”95  That same day, 
Pinckney proposed the powers “To establish seminaries for the promotion of 
literature and the arts & sciences,” “To grant patents for useful inventions,” 
and “To secure to Authors exclusive rights for a certain time.”96  These 
proposals were submitted initially to the Committee of Detail but later fell to 
the Committee of Eleven whose members included both Madison and 
Sherman.97  Walterscheid suggests that the intellectual property clause 
combined the copyright, patent, and “advancement of useful knowledge” 
provisions into one and concludes that incorporation of language close to the 
“advancement of useful knowledge” provision “suggests that the Framers 
viewed the intellectual property clause expansively.”98 
Significantly, however, the more expansive language authorizing grants of 
premiums and provisions for the advancement of useful knowledge and 
discoveries proposed by Madison did not survive the committee and never 
became part of the Constitution, nor is there any hint in the Copyright Clause 
that it was intended to operate in such a way.  Walterscheid concedes that both 
Madison and Sherman took a limited view of the Intellectual Property 
Clause.99 
The views of Madison should be accorded particularly great weight in 
determining what the Framers intended as it concerns the Copyright Clause.  
Madison, after all, proposed the copyright power and the “advancement of 
useful knowledge” powers, and he served on the Committee of Eleven that 
came up with the final language of the Copyright Clause.100  Sherman, too, was 
 
 95. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 49, at 325. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 321–22, 324 (submitted to Committee of Detail); id. at 473, 481 (appointing 
Committee of Eleven to consider unfinished business; listing committee members). 
 98. Walterscheid, supra note 83, at 94; accord Walterscheid, supra note 65, at 343. 
 99. See Walterscheid, supra note 83, at 103 (recognizing that Madison and Sherman 
“narrowly construed the clause”).  Walterscheid concludes that 
Madison narrowly construed the intellectual property clause as authorizing only the 
issuance of patents of invention and precluding any other means of promoting the 
progress of useful arts.  Although he was silent as to the issue of promoting the progress 
of science, i.e., learning and knowledge as encompassed within the broad compass of 
education, it is apparent that his argument necessarily applied to federal funding of 
education as well. 
Id. at 105.  Walterscheid’s view that Madison narrowly construed the clause appears correct.  
This Article takes no position on the issue of whether Madison viewed the clause as a general bar 
to any efforts under other constitutional provisions that had the effect of promoting the progress 
of science in other ways. 
 100. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 49, at 473, 481, 505, 508–09.  Madison likely 
played the most important role of any Framer in the inclusion of the Copyright Clause in the 
Constitution.  See Dallon, supra note 10, at 421–23 (noting Madison’s involvement in copyright 
legislation beginning in the Continental Congress in 1783, the Virginia legislature in 1785, and 
the Constitutional Convention). 
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a member of the Committee of Eleven.  Significantly, Madison and Sherman, 
the only members of the Committee of Eleven with known views about the 
Copyright Clause, appear to have viewed the clause as limited to copyright and 
patent legislation.  Even Alexander Hamilton, one of the most radical, pro-
central government members of the Constitutional Convention,101 in some 
respects either agreed with or acknowledged Madison’s limited view of the 
Intellectual Property Clause.102 
The Framers’ debate concerning the proposal to include the power for 
Congress to establish a national university also supports the view that the 
Framers did not intend the “to promote” phrase to extend beyond copyrights 
and patents.  Madison and Pinckney initially proposed the power to establish a 
university, in Madison’s words,103 or a seminary, in Pinckney’s words,104 and 
Pinckney added: “for the promotion of literature and the arts & sciences.”105  
The Committee of Eleven deleted this power from its report, and Madison and 
Pinckney jointly moved to reinsert the power to establish a university in the list 
of congressional powers.106  The Convention rejected the proposal.107 
Madison and Pinckney’s joint motion to insert the power was proposed, 
debated, and rejected after the Convention had already agreed to the Copyright 
Clause.108  Gouverneur Morris argued that it was not necessary because it 
would already be achieved by the “exclusive power at the Seat of 
 
 101. Hamilton’s views were radical in their strong support for a powerful central government.  
See JOHN C. MILLER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON: PORTRAIT IN PARADOX 161–62 (1959) (noting 
Hamilton’s support of a strong central government and stating “[h]ad Hamilton seen his way 
clear, he no doubt would have recommended the abolition of the states”).  His views on the 
meaning of the Copyright Clause, while of interest, are less convincing than those of Madison 
and Sherman, in part because he was absent from the convention when the clause was proposed, 
drafted, and approved.  See 1 BROADUS MITCHELL, ALEXANDER HAMILTON: YOUTH TO 
MATURITY 1755–1788, at 407 (1957) (noting Hamilton’s absence from the Convention for most 
of August and noting that “[t]he next mention of Hamilton in the convention proceedings is on 
September 6, which is probably as early as he attended”); 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 
49, at 321–22 (noting proposal of copyright and patent powers on Aug. 18, 1787); id. at 505, 509 
(noting approval of Copyright Clause on Sept. 5, 1787). 
 102. See Walterscheid, supra note 83, at 109 (stating that Hamilton conceded that there was a 
question about the authority of Congress under the Constitution to grant patents of importation).  
Hamilton did advocate for broad congressional power to promote the progress of science under 
the general welfare clause and implicitly did not view the Copyright Clause as a bar to achieving 
those goals.  Id. at 111.  Significantly, he relied upon other congressional powers and not the 
Copyright Clause for the authority.  Id. 
 103. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 49, at 325. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 616. 
 107. Id. 
 108. The Copyright Clause was approved on Sept. 5, 1787, 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra 
note 49, at 509; the university proposal was rejected on September 14, 1787, id. at 616. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
322 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:307 
Government.”109  If the “to promote” phrase was intended to convey a broad 
power beyond copyrights and patents, Article I, section 8, clause 8 would have 
been primary authority supporting creation of a university.  Neither Madison 
nor Pinckney would have needed to advocate for insertion of the power “to 
establish an University,”110 and Morris could have easily pointed to the power 
“to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” as negating a need for the 
separate power to establish a university.  These Framers understood that the 
Copyright Clause did not reach so far. 
The First Congress doubted that the Copyright Clause extended beyond the 
grant of copyrights and patents.  As early as 1789, in response to a request by 
John Churchman to fund a scientific voyage, members of Congress questioned 
whether any provision of the Constitution authorized that expenditure.  
Representative Tucker,111 one of the three-member committee appointed to 
report on the petition, “[e]xpressed a doubt whether the Legislature has power, 
by the Constitution, to go further in rewarding the inventors of useful 
machines, or discoveries in sciences, than merely to secure to them for a time 
the right of making, publishing and vending them.”112  Sherman,113 then a 
member of the House of Representatives, also opposed the funding.  He 
believed that the committee report, which encouraged protection for 
Churchman’s map, globe, and tables, went far enough.114  “It appears gone as 
far as proper to go at this time, as far as warranted by the Constitution.”115  
 
 109. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (giving power to legislate over the seat of the 
United States government). 
 110. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 49, at 616. 
 111. Thomas Tudor Tucker was a representative from South Carolina in the First and Second 
Congresses, and he was the United States treasurer from 1801–1828. 14 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 858, 862 
(William C. DiGiacomantonio et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
FIRST CONGRESS]. 
 112. 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA 220 (Charles Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter 10 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS]. 
 113. Roger Sherman was a representative from Connecticut in the First Congress and was 
then appointed to the Senate.  14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 111, 
at 512. 
 114. See 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS supra note 112, at 213; 4 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 510 (Charles Bangs Bickford, et. al. eds., 1986)  (providing text of Apr. 20, 1789 
committee report) [hereinafter 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS]. 
 115. 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 112, at 213.  Lloyd’s 
sometimes cryptic notes of Sherman’s speech continue: 
This report of committee will show that they supposed his discovery worthy attention and 
giving the exclusive right to benefit by the discovery.  If have a right to go further and lay 
out money it must be upon—Gentleman has fruitful invention. . . . The committee thought 
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When the same funding proposal was made again in 1790, a committee of 
three, which included Madison, stated that the proposal “involves an enquiry 
into the Constitutional powers of Congress, as well as the expediency of 
furnishing the aid requested . . . .”116  The proposal was rejected by the 
House.117 
This understanding of the Copyright Clause is confirmed by other early 
authorities.  Law professor and judge St. George Tucker118 in 1803 wrote that 
the constitution not only declares the object, but points out the express mode of 
giving the encouragement . . . . Nothing could be more superfluous, or 
incompatible, with the object contended for, than these words, if it was, 
indeed, the intention of the constitution to authorize congress, to adopt any 
other mode which they might think proper.119 
United States Attorney General William Wirt, arguing Gibbons v. Ogden,120 
stated the view that “Congress has the power to promote the progress of 
science and the useful arts; but only in one mode, viz. by securing, for a 
limited time, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective 
writings and discoveries.”121  Justice Joseph Story, in 1833, wrote of the clause 
that “[t]he power, in its terms, is confined to authors and inventors.”122 
President Washington believed that the Constitution, at least somewhere, 
allowed promotion of science and knowledge by means other than copyrights 
 
fit to go as far as this to promote the progress; they did not think proper to give any 
further power to encourage this useful discovery. 
Id.  Rep. Seney of Maryland, 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 111, 
at 589, likewise doubted that the Copyright Clause authorized Congress to fund the expedition.  
Lloyd’s cryptic notes summarize Seney’s comments: “Doubt if—No doubt of adopting the report 
to secure—I have doubts whether in power or not to give money.  I much doubt if 
encouragement—any other mode than that mentioned, other than securing.”  10 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 112, at 214. 
 116. 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 114, at 531. 
 117. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA 689 (Linda G. De Pauw, et. al. eds., 1977) (“It passed in the negative.”) [hereinafter 
3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS]; 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST 
CONGRESS, supra note 114, at 529–30 (motion “disagreed to”). 
 118. St. George Tucker was also the brother of U.S. Rep. Thomas Tucker.  14 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 111, at 858–59. 
 119. 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, 
TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; 
AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 266–67 (1803). 
 120. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 121. Id. at 165–66; see also id. at 166 (stating that the clause is the grant “of one mode of 
promoting the progress of science and the useful arts,” recognizing that other modes existed and 
could clearly be exercised by the states). 
 122. 3 STORY, supra note 91, § 1148.  But see 2 id. § 968 (suggesting that a tax on foreigners 
or foreign inventions might be appropriate construing the power to tax and the power to promote 
the progress of science and useful arts). 
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and patents, and he encouraged Congress to establish and fund a national 
university.123  Washington did not point to the constitutional provision that 
would authorize establishment of a national university, and members of 
Congress were quick to question the constitutionality of such action.124  No 
action was taken on Washington’s proposal.125 
In short, on the admittedly thin record available, it appears that the Framers 
and ratifiers of the Copyright Clause first and foremost intended to grant 
Congress the power to enact copyright laws and patent laws.  This grant of 
power would necessarily further the objective of promoting the progress of 
science and useful arts.  The Framers did not intend to grant, at least by means 
of the Copyright Clause, a broad power to take any action to promote the 
progress of science. 
3. Taking the Broad View of Promoting the Progress of Science 
The petitioners in Eldred made the argument that the retroactive extension 
of existing copyrights failed to promote the progress of science because the 
extension failed to stimulate creation of new works.126  The petitioners, in 
substance, restated this same argument a second time when they argued that 
the clause requires a “quid pro quo”; the author gives the work in exchange for 
the rights afforded by copyright protection.127  This view is born of a narrow 
reading of the “to promote” phrase, not supported by the language or history of 
the clause. 
“To promote the Progress of Science” means to encourage the 
advancement of knowledge.  In the language of the late eighteenth century, 
 
 123. See 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 117, at 253–54 (text of 
Washington’s speech to both houses of Congress, dated Jan. 8, 1790). 
 124. 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA 1221 (Helen Veit et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
FIRST CONGRESS].  Rep. Stone, of Maryland, see 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST 
CONGRESS, supra note 111, at 598, 
enquired what part of the Constitution authorised Congress to take any steps in a business 
of this kind—for his part he knew of none.  We have already done as much as we can with 
propriety—We have encouraged learning, by giving to authors an exclusive privilege of 
vending their works—this is going as far as we have power to, by the Constitution. 
13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS, supra, at 1221.  But cf. id. (stating Rep. Page 
thought that Congress did have the power but suggested the matter be investigated). 
 125. The proposal was made in 1790 and again in 1796.  See 1 THE STATE OF THE UNION 
MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENT 1790–1966, at 3, 35 (Fred L. Israel ed., 1966). 
 126. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 211–12 (2003); see also Brief for Petitioners, supra 
note 11, at 15–16, 22 (making the argument that enactments must stimulate creation of works). 
 127. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 214; Brief for Petitioners, supra note 11, at 23 (“Congress may 
make a trade—it may grant an ‘exclusive Right’ for a ‘limited Time[ ]’ in exchange for a 
‘Writing’ by an ‘Author.’”).  Under this theory, the CTEA violates the requirement by awarding a 
windfall—additional copyright protection in exchange for nothing.  See id. 
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“science” had the broad meaning of knowledge.128  “Promote” meant to 
advance, to forward, or to contribute to the growth of something.129  “Promote” 
also meant “encourage.”130  “Progress” meant an “advance in knowledge; 
intellectual or moral improvement; proficiency.”131  Thus, the clause intended 
to forward or encourage the advancement of knowledge.132  This interpretation 
is in harmony with the copyright objectives stated by Congress immediately 
following ratification of the Constitution in the Copyright Act of 1790.  In 
genuinely preambular language, Congress stated the purpose of the law: “An 
Act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies . . . to the 
authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned.”133  
 
 128. The early American authority Noah Webster defined “science”: “1.  In a general sense, 
knowledge, or certain knowledge . . . . 4.  Any art or species of knowledge. . . . 5.  One of the 
seven liberal branches of knowledge, viz. grammar, logic, rhetoric, arithmetic, geometry, 
astronomy and music.”  2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (Johnson Reprint Corporation 1970) (1828) (unpaginated); accord 2 SAMUEL 
JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1785) (unpaginated; giving 
essentially identical definition of “science” as Webster). 
 129. 2 WEBSTER, supra note 128 (definition of “promote”: “To forward; to advance; to 
contribute to the growth, enlargement or excellence of any thing valuable . . . .”); 2 JOHNSON, 
supra note 128 (defining “promote” as to “To forward; to advance”). 
 130. See 2 WEBSTER, supra note 128 (definition of “promotion”: “The act of promoting; 
advancement; encouragement . . . .”); 2 JOHNSON, supra note 128 (defining “promotion” as 
“Advancement; encouragement”); see also Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973) 
(finding “to promote” synonymous with “to stimulate,” “to encourage,” or “to induce”).  Both the 
Pennsylvania and New York copyright acts used the word “promote” or “promotion” seemingly 
synonymously with encourage or encouragement.  See COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 55, 
at 10 (Pennsylvania act, “for the encouragement and promotion of learning”); id. at 19 (New York 
act, “AN ACT to promote literature”). 
 131. 2 WEBSTER, supra note 128 (definition of “progress”); accord 2 JOHNSON, supra note 
128 (defining “progress” as “Intellectual improvement; advancement in knowledge; 
proficience”); cf. Orrin G. Hatch & Thomas R. Lee, “To Promote the Progress of Science”: The 
Copyright Clause and Congress’s Power to Extend Copyrights, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 12 
(2002) (arguing that to “promote the progress of science” meant to promote distribution or 
dissemination of works); Malla Pollack, What is Congress Supposed to Promote?: Defining 
“Progress” in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution or Introducing the 
Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754, 803, 809 (2001) (arguing that “progress” in the Copyright 
Clause means physical “spread”).  The Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island 
copyright acts made reference to the need to encourage “the progress of civilization.”  
COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 55, at 4, 8–9. 
 132. James Iredell (later Justice Iredell), in urging ratification of the Constitution, appeared to 
equate the language with “encouragement to genius.”  16 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION, supra note 28, at 386 (Norfolk & Portsmouth J., by “Marcus IV” (James Iredell), 
dated Mar. 12, 1788). 
 133. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.  This language closely parallels the language 
of the first English copyright statute, the Statute of Anne in 1710.  8 Ann., c. 19 (1710) (Eng.) 
(“An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by vesting the Copies of printed Books in the 
Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned”). 
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Representative Stone’s statement in May 1790 also appeared to equate 
promoting the progress of science with encouraging learning.134  The 
encouragement of learning theme had also been expressed in the state 
copyright acts, just prior to the Constitution.135 
The “to promote” phrase on its face is broad.  The Framers intended for 
Congress to have the power to legislate in the area of copyrights.  They further 
communicated their belief and desire that copyright protection would have the 
effect of promoting the progress of science but likely they did not intend 
judicial scrutiny of each amendment to a copyright act to determine whether 
the enactment standing alone promoted the progress of science.  This may have 
been the Supreme Court’s point when it held that “the Copyright Clause 
empowers Congress to determine the intellectual property regimes that, 
overall, in that body’s judgment, will serve the ends of the Clause.”136  So long 
as the resulting copyright act promotes the progress of science, then a 
particular germane amendment need not be measured against the “to promote” 
phrase. 
Taking the petitioners’ view of the “to promote” clause would call into 
question other amendments of the Copyright Act of 1976 (the “1976 Act”).  In 
1990, Congress enacted the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), and added 
section 106A to the 1976 Act.137  VARA allows an author of a work of visual 
art to claim authorship of the work, to prevent use of the author’s name in 
some cases, and to prevent distortion, mutilation, or destruction of the work, 
regardless of whether or not the author is the copyright owner.138  The Act 
applied retroactively to already-created works still owned139 by the authors, as 
 
 134. 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 124, at 1221 (quoting 
Gazette of the United States, 5 May 1790) (“We have encouraged learning, by giving to authors 
an exclusive privilege of vending their works—this is going as far as we have power to, by the 
Constitution.”); cf. 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 112, at 213 
(statement of Rep. Sherman, Apr. 20, 1789, referring to Churchman’s request to fund his 
scientific voyage; noting that beyond copyright and patent protections, “[t]he committee thought 
fit to go as far as this to promote the progress; they did not think proper to give any further power 
to encourage this useful discovery”). 
 135. See, e.g., COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 55, at 1–2 (Connecticut act, “for the 
encouragement of literature and genius,” “for the encouragement of learning”); id. at 6 (New 
Jersey act, “for the promotion and encouragement of literature”); id. at 10 (Pennsylvania act, “for 
the encouragement and promotion of learning”); id. at 17 (Georgia act, “encourage men of 
learning and genius”). 
 136. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003) (emphasis added). 
 137. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §603, 104 Stat. 5089, 5128–33 
(1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000)). 
 138. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a). 
 139. In this sense, “owned” has reference to the tangible medium in which the work is fixed 
rather than the copyright.  See id. § 106A(d)(2) (referencing works “title to which has not . . . 
been transferred from the author”). 
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well as to future works.140  The new benefits conferred upon authors of this 
class of existing works did not create an incentive for creation of those works.  
With VARA, borrowing the terminology of the Eldred petitioners, there was 
no “quid pro quo,” but rather “a windfall” to authors of those particular 
existing works; authors did not give a work to the public in exchange for these 
added protections. 
The broad view of the “to promote” phrase does not require such an 
analysis.  Instead, this view would inquire whether the 1976 Act, as amended 
by VARA, continued to secure to authors for limited times rights to their 
works which would have the effect of promoting knowledge.  Alternatively, a 
more limited but still broad view would inquire whether VARA itself secured 
to authors for limited times rights to their works that would have the effect of 
promoting knowledge.  VARA would pass either of these tests.  First, the basic 
copyright scheme remained intact, and authors received new rights to their 
works.  Second, these new rights allowed authors to preserve works and 
truthfully inform the public concerning the origin and nature of those works. 
In 1994, Congress enacted the Uruguay Round Agreements Act 
(URAA)141 adding section 104A to the 1976 Act.142  The amendment restored 
copyright in certain existing foreign works that had passed into the public 
domain.143  The authors of works whose copyrights were restored did not give 
anything to the public in exchange for the new copyright protection.  The 
broad view of the “to promote” phrase does not require such an exchange.144  
The basic copyright scheme remained intact, and arguably the restored 
copyright owners might be encouraged to create new works by perceived 
strong commitment to copyright protection demonstrated by the Act. 
Many provisions of the 1976 Act taken in isolation, had they been offered 
as amendments to the Act, would not have provided incentive for creation of 
new works.  For example, section 108,145 permitting certain copying of works 
 
 140. Id.  In fact, the Act provides a longer duration of protection for the category of works 
created before the effective date of the Act but whose title remained in the author, than for those 
works created after the effective date of the Act.  See id. § 106A(d)(1) (stating that rights in post-
effective date works last only for life of the author); id. § 106A(d)(2) (qualifying pre-effective 
date works receive protection for the same term as rights conveyed under § 106 (now life of the 
author plus seventy years)). 
 141. Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 514, 108 Stat. 4976 (1994). 
 142. 17 U.S.C. § 104A. 
 143. Id. § 104A(a), (h)(6). 
 144. Two courts recently rejected attacks on the constitutionality of the URAA.  See Luck’s 
Music Library, Inc. v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding restoration of 
copyrights under URAA constitutional); Golan v. Gonzales, No. Civ. 01-B-1854 (BNB), 2005 
WL 914754, at *2 (D. Colo. Apr. 20, 2005) (same). 
 145. 17 U.S.C. § 108.  Section 108 was part of the original 1976 Act, although it has been 
amended. 
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by libraries and archives, and section 110,146 announcing exceptions to the 
performance and display rights, primarily limit authors’ exclusive rights.  
Permitting copying, performance, or display of protected works without 
authorization of the copyright holder, while perfectly sensible and beneficial to 
the public, does not create incentives for authors of the original works to create 
new works—if anything, it reduces the incentives otherwise afforded by the 
exclusive rights.  Nevertheless, these provisions, as part of a larger copyright 
act, support a scheme of incentives for authors.  Moreover, individually each 
promotes the progress of science by providing the public reasonable access and 
opportunity to use protected works.  These provisions, had they come as later 
amendments to the Copyright Act, could have been viewed as “windfalls”—
this time not for copyright holders, but for the public. 
The point is this: adopting the Eldred petitioners’ reading of the Copyright 
Clause would have invited untold mischief by imposing close scrutiny of each 
amendment of the Copyright Act to determine whether the amendment on its 
own merits promoted the progress of science by encouraging creation of new 
works or publication of works.  This limited approach would call into question 
many prior or future amendments, which might strengthen or improve the 
overall copyright scheme, but which, standing alone, do not encourage creation 
or publication of works.  The petitioners tried to avoid this problem by limiting 
their test only to amendments extending the duration of copyrights and thus 
implicating the “limited Times” requirement.147  Nevertheless, it is difficult to 
justify selective application of the phrase to only copyright terms and not other 
aspects of copyright law. 
To the extent that the “to promote” phrase is viewed as a limitation on the 
power of Congress when legislating in the area of copyrights, the phrase 
establishes, at most, only a low threshold.  Although the entire clause does 
identify the means for achieving the promotion of the progress of science (by 
securing to authors exclusive rights to their writings), neither the “to promote” 
phrase nor the broader Copyright Clause specifies how copyright law must 
promote the progress of science.  The Copyright Clause does not specifically 
require creation of new works, distribution or publication of unpublished 
works, or any other particular knowledge-promoting end. 
This broad interpretation of the Copyright Clause is consistent with the 
early history of copyrights both in Europe and the United States.  The earliest 
copyrights in fifteenth century Europe were not strictly reserved for protection 
of newly authored works.  In some cases these early privileges protected works 
 
 146. Id. § 110.  Section 110 was also part of the original 1976 Act, although it has been 
amended. 
 147. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 211 (2003) (stating petitioners’ argument that 
preamble language was not independently enforceable limit on Congress’s power, but informed 
meaning of “limited Times” requirement). 
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hundreds of years old and were a means of encouraging publication of existing 
works.148  Similarly, in the United States, a major impetus for copyright 
protection was Noah Webster’s desire for protection of his nearly completed, 
or, as was the case in some states, both completed and published spelling and 
grammar book (the “blue-backed speller”).149 
The Copyright Act of 1790 (the “1790 Act”) protected works created after 
its enactment, but it also protected existing works created before the Act, 
including already-published works.150  The 1790 Act was prompted by several 
private petitions to Congress for copyright protection for existing works.  The 
first petition seeking copyright protection was from David Ramsay, who in 
April 1789 applied to Congress for copyright protection for two works he had 
written.151  The first work already was written and published; the second was 
to be published shortly.152  His petition asked for protection of both works “as 
a compensation for his labour and expence and finding the same principle 
expressly recognized in the new Constitution . . . .”153  The House Committee 
report recommended protection for both works without suggesting any 
constitutional doubt.154  Rather than moving forward with the petition as an 
individual request, however, Congress referred it, and a similar petition from 
John Churchman, to a committee for preparation of general copyright 
legislation.155 
 
 148. See HORATIO F. BROWN, THE VENETIAN PRINTING PRESS 54 (1891) (noting early 
practice of granting copyrights to publishers for works authored by others).  For example, a 
copyright for the Letters of St. Catherine of Siena was granted in 1494–1495.  Id. at 58–59.  The 
letters were originally written from about 1370 to 1380.  1 THE LETTERS OF ST. CATHERINE OF 
SIENA 3 (Suzanne Noffke trans., 1988). 
 149. See Nachbar, supra note 62, at 43–44 (rebutting quid pro quo requirement and noting 
state copyright protection for Webster’s work).  Webster’s book was finished by the summer of 
1783 and published on October 7, 1783.  RICHARD M. ROLLINS, THE LONG JOURNEY OF NOAH 
WEBSTER 34 (1980).  Congress passed its resolution encouraging states to enact copyright laws in 
May 1783, and the various states passed their copyright laws during the period of early 1783 to 
1786.  See COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 55, at 1–21; see also, e.g., Letter from Noah 
Webster to the New York State Legislature (Jan. 18, 1783), in LETTERS OF NOAH WEBSTER 5, 5 
(Harry R. Warfel ed., 1953) (letter asking state to grant copyright protection to Webster’s book); 
Letter from Noah Webster to James Madison (July 5, 1784), in LETTERS OF NOAH WEBSTER 
supra, at 8, 9 (letter asking Madison to encourage Virginia legislature to grant copyright 
protection to Webster’s book). 
 150. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (1790). 
 151. 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA 34–35 (Kenneth R. Bowling et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter 8 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS] (Petition of David Ramsay, Charleston, S.C., dated Apr. 4, 1789). 
 152. Id.  
 153. Id. 
 154. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 61, at 29 (House Journal 
entry for Apr. 20, 1789). 
 155. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
330 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:307 
Shortly after the Ramsay and Churchman petitions, Jedidiah Morse applied 
to Congress for copyright protection for his already-written and published 
work, again noting Congress’s power under the Constitution.156  Morse 
complained that his work was already being copied without his consent.157  
The House, again without any suggestion of a constitutional problem, referred 
his petition to the committee tasked to prepare general copyright legislation.158  
Ultimately, in 1790, Congress enacted the first United States copyright act, and 
soon after the Act was passed both Churchman and Morse registered the 
copyrights for their already existing and published works.159  (It is not known 
whether Ramsay ever registered the copyrights in the works referred to in his 
petition because the records of the courthouse where he would have registered 
them no longer exist.)160  The important point is that early authors and the First 
Congress, which included many Framers, in 1790 understood the Copyright 
Clause in the only recently ratified Constitution to empower Congress to grant 
copyright protection to existing, published works.  Possibly, by rewarding 
authors of existing works Congress believed it promoted the progress of 
science by providing remuneration161 for their past efforts, hence encouraging 
those same authors to continue their creative efforts in the future.162  In any 
event, the approach of the First Congress is consistent with a broad 
understanding of the “to promote” phrase and discredits the Eldred petitioners’ 
 
 156. 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 151, at 36 (Petition of 
Jedidiah Morse, Charlestown, Mass., dated Apr. 15, 1789 and May 12, 1789).  Others also 
petitioned Congress for copyright protection for their existing works.  See, e.g., id. at 36–37 
(Nicholas Pike to Benjamin Goodhue, May 23, 1789) (seeking protection for his published work); 
3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 117, at 118 (House Journal entry for 
July 22, 1789) (referring to petition by Hannah Adams seeking “an exclusive privilege” for “a 
limited time” to publish her work on religious sects); id. at 424 (House Journal entry for May 26, 
1790) (referencing petition of Enos Hitchcock seeking copyright protection for his published 
book). 
 157. 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 151, at 36. 
 158. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 117, at 56–57, 60 (House 
Journal entries for May 12 & 14, 1789). 
 159. 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 151, at 29–30.  
Churchman’s works were registered on June 17, 1790; Morse’s works were registered on July 10, 
1790.  Id.  Others who had sought copyright protection also registered their works.  Adams 
registered the second edition of her work on July 6, 1791.  Id. at 31.  Hitchcock registered his 
work on Aug. 9, 1790.  Id. at 32. 
 160. Id. at 29.  Two of Ramsay’s other works, both “orations,” were registered for copyright 
protection in 1794 and 1800.  FEDERAL COPYRIGHT RECORDS 1790–1800, at 130–31 (James 
Gilreath ed., 1987) (reproducing South Carolina district court copyright records for 1794–1800). 
 161. Or, in the words of the times, “pecuniary emolument.”  8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
RATIFICATION, supra note 151, at 35 (House Committee Report on Ramsay and Churchman 
Petitions, Apr. 20, 1789). 
 162. In the case of Churchman, in particular, the House committee considering his petition 
viewed the award of copyright as encouragement of his continuing research efforts in the area of 
navigation based on magnetic points.  Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2006] ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE 331 
argument that any congressional copyright enactment must stimulate creation 
of new works that must be offered up by the author in exchange for the 
copyright protection.163 
The Eldred petitioners argued that the 1790 Act, by extending copyright 
protection to existing works, involved the necessary exchange of the authors’ 
state-granted or common law copyrights for federal copyright protection.164  
This argument has as its necessary premises first, that the authors of existing 
works already held legally protected rights, and second, that the new federal 
copyright protection preempted or superseded those existing rights.  The first 
premise is necessary or otherwise the authors would have had nothing of value 
to surrender in exchange for federal protection.  Some of those seeking 
protection for their already-written works did have state copyright 
registrations,165 but others likely did not.166  The 1790 Act was completely 
indifferent to the existence of prior copyright protection and offered protection 
for published works regardless of their state copyright status.167 
Concerning common law copyright, although there may have been some 
theoretical question about the existence of common law copyright, it was clear 
that, to the extent the right existed at all,168 it did not afford any practical legal 
protection.  The forces seeking copyright protection in the states prior to the 
Constitution and on the federal level thereafter were not seeking an improved 
mechanism to enforce existing, recognized legal rights.  These authors had no 
legal protection for their copyright interests, and they understood keenly the 
need for statutory copyright protection.  In advocating for state copyright laws, 
Noah Webster did not argue that existing protections were ineffective, rather, 
he complained that his book and efforts were “not protected by the laws that 
protect every other species of property.”169  Jedidiah Morse, in the spring of 
1789, petitioned Congress for copyright protection, noting “as the work is 
already published and as your Petitioner has no Security against its 
 
 163. See supra notes 126–36 and accompanying text. 
 164. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 11, at 28–29. 
 165. See, e.g., 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 151, at 30–31.  
Nicholas Pike had copyrights in four states before petitioning Congress for protection.  Id. at 31.  
Hannah Adams had a copyright under Massachusetts law before petitioning Congress for 
protection.  Id. 
 166. Delaware did not have state copyright protection, and some state copyright laws may 
never have become operative.  See COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 55, at 21.  Delaware 
had no act.  Id.  Maryland’s act was to become effective only after all states had passed similar 
acts.  Id. at 6.  Pennsylvania’s act also was to become effective only after all states had passed 
similar acts.  Id. at 11. 
 167. See Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 1, §1, 1 Stat. 124 (1790). 
 168. The Supreme Court in 1834 held that there was no common law copyright for published 
works in America.  Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 663 (1834). 
 169. Letter from Noah Webster to the New York State Legislature (Jan. 1783), in LETTERS OF 
NOAH WEBSTER, supra note 149, at 5, 7. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
332 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:307 
Republication by any other person.”170  Authors of existing works did not give 
up any meaningful common law copyrights in exchange for the new federal 
copyright protection afforded by the 1790 Act. 
The second premise, that the new federal copyright statute preempted or 
superseded existing rights, is at best uncertain and likely incorrect.  It is 
doubtful whether the Copyright Clause or the 1790 Act preempted state 
copyright protections,171 and in modern times the Supreme Court has 
 
 170. 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 151, at 36. 
 171. Edward Walterscheid takes the view that the First Congress likely believed that the 
Intellectual Property Clause did preempt state patent and copyright laws, and appears to agree that 
this is the better view.  EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 436, 468–69 (2002).  There is 
historical support for this view.  Nicholas Pike, who petitioned Congress in 1789 for copyright 
protection, apparently believed that his state copyrights were invalid, possibly due to the adoption 
of the Constitution.  He stated: 
  As I find that one & another are petitioning Congress respecting the Copy-rights of 
their Works; I beg leave to request the favor of your Attention in my behalf. 
  I have already been at great trouble & some Cost in sending through the United 
States for the purpose of securing mine; which is now of no Validity. 
8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 151, at 36; see also WILLIAM 
RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 102 (1825) 
(stating, specifically in reference to state patent laws, that “there can be no doubt that, as soon as 
congress legislated on the subject . . . all the state provisions ceased”). 
  There is, however, evidence suggesting that the clause did not preempt state copyright 
protection.  The Patent Act of 1793, also authorized by Article I, section 8, clause 8, required an 
applicant for federal patent to relinquish any rights obtained under prior state laws.  “That where 
any state, before its adoption of the present form of government, shall have granted an exclusive 
right to any invention, the party, claiming that right, shall not be capable of obtaining an 
exclusive right under this act, but on relinquishing his right under such particular state . . . .”  
Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 7, 1 Stat. 318, 322 (1793) (prior to revisions in Patent Act of 1836).  
If the Intellectual Property Clause preempted prior state law protections, the provision of the 1793 
Patent Act would have been completely unnecessary.  Rawle believed that the provision was 
included as an act of caution, see RAWLE, supra, at 102, but at a minimum the provision 
demonstrates doubt whether the clause preempted state law protections and may indicate that in 
fact it did not.  Also, on its face the Act permitted a holder of a state right to retain the state 
protection and decline federal protection. 
  Other evidence also suggests that the Copyright Clause did not limit or preempt state 
copyright protections.  See also BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND 
COPYRIGHT LAW 124 (1967) (noting that state copyright systems “passed out of use” but were 
“not rendered illegal by the Federal legislation and did not die immediately” as demonstrated by 
issuance of a copyright under South Carolina law in 1792 after enactment of the first federal 
copyright act); Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507, 581 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1812) (Kent, C.J., 
separate opinion) (“That power only secures, for a limited time, to authors and inventors the 
exclusive privilege to their writings and discoveries; and as it is not granted, by exclusive words, 
to the United States, nor prohibited to the individual states, it is a concurrent power which may be 
exercised by the states . . . .”).  Many of the state copyright acts were not repealed until many 
years after the Constitution and the 1790 Act.  See, e.g., COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 
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concluded that as a matter of constitutional law the states have concurrent 
power to grant copyright protection.172  In Goldstein v. California, the Court 
held that the Copyright Clause “does not provide that such power shall vest 
exclusively in the Federal Government.  Nor does the Constitution expressly 
provide that such power shall not be exercised by the States.”173  Nothing in 
the 1790 Act expressly negated state-granted copyright protection.174  Federal 
copyright protection likely did not formally replace or void any existing state 
copyright grants, although as a practical matter it may have made state 
copyright grants obsolete because of the advantages of federal protection. 
As it concerned common law copyright protection, in Wheaton v. Peters,175 
the Supreme Court found that no common law copyright existed in the United 
States.176  Therefore, the Court had no reason to reach the question of whether 
either the Constitution or the copyright act of the time preempted an existing 
common law right. 
Later, the Copyright Act of 1909 (the “1909 Act”) afforded statutory 
copyright protection only to published works,177 thus creating a direct incentive 
for publication of works—not merely the creation of new works.  In contrast, 
the Copyright Act of 1976 (the “1976 Act”) affords copyright protection upon 
fixation in a tangible medium, instead of publication.178  Each of these schemes 
(the 1790 Act, the 1909 Act, and the 1976 Act) promoted learning or 
knowledge, although they differed in substance and detail. 
The Framers may have believed that copyright protection primarily would 
advance knowledge by encouraging creation of new works or publication of 
previously unpublished works, but the language of the Constitution is not 
limited to those ends.  The Framers did not tie down future generations to any 
particular view of the progress of science.  Justice Story, in Martin v. Hunter’s 
Lessee,179 recognized that 
  [t]he constitution unavoidably deals in general language.  It did not suit the 
purposes of the people, in framing this great charter of our liberties, to provide 
for minute specifications of its powers, or to declare the means by which those 
 
55, at 3 (Connecticut act repealed in 1812); id. at 7 (New Jersey act repealed in 1799); id. at 8 
(New Hampshire act repealed in 1842). 
 172. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 560 (1973) (“[T]he language of the 
Constitution neither explicitly precludes the States from granting copyrights nor grants such 
authority exclusively to the Federal Government.”). 
 173. Id. at 553. 
 174. In contrast, the Copyright Act of 1976, by statute, does preempt most state copyright 
protection.  See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2000). 
 175. 33 U.S. 591 (8 Pet.) (1834). 
 176. Id. at 661, 663. 
 177. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 9, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077 (protection required publication 
with notice). 
 178. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
 179. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
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powers should be carried into execution. . . .  The instrument was not intended 
to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years, but was to endure through 
a long lapse of ages . . . .180 
The Pennsylvania Constitution, a close contemporary of the United States 
Constitution,181 contained the provision: “The arts and sciences shall be 
promoted in one or more seminaries of learning.”182  Pinckney proposed 
similar language for the United States Constitution at the same time he 
proposed the patent and copyright powers.183  Like the Copyright Clause, the 
Pennsylvania provision identified the objective—“the arts and sciences shall be 
promoted”—and the means to achieve that objective (implying establishment 
of “one or more seminaries of learning”).184  The provision did not direct how 
universities must promote the arts and sciences, nor would one expect a 
constitutional provision to be so limiting.  This phrase in the Pennsylvania 
Constitution, notwithstanding its similarity to the “to promote the progress of 
science” phrase, could not reasonably refer exclusively to creation of new 
works or inventions of new discoveries.  Other state constitutions of the time 
also contained language encouraging  “arts and sciences” and promotion of arts 
and sciences by supporting universities and public schools.185  These 
 
 180. Id. at 326.  He continued: “Hence its powers are expressed in general terms, leaving to 
the legislature, from time to time, to adopt its own means to effectuate legitimate objects, and to 
mould and model the exercise of its powers, as its own wisdom, and the public interests, should 
require.”  Id. at 326–27. 
 181. The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 was adopted September 2, 1790.  5 THE 
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS: COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF 
THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 3092 n.a (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter THE FEDERAL 
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS]. 
 182. PA. CONST. of 1790 art. VII, § 2, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 181, at 3092, 3099. 
 183. See 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 49, at 324–25 (noting Pinckney’s proposal 
empowering Congress “[t]o establish seminaries for the promotion of literature and the arts & 
sciences”). 
 184. PA. CONST. of 1790 art. VII, § 2, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra, note 181, at 3092, 3099. 
 185. The Massachusetts Constitution of March 2, 1780, recognized the value of the 
“encouragement of arts and sciences” in granted authority to the president and fellows of Harvard 
College.  MASS. CONST. of 1780 ch. V, § 1, art. 1, reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 181, at 1906.  The same constitution directed the “legislatures and 
magistrates . . . to encourage private societies and public institutions, rewards and immunities, for 
the promotion of agriculture, arts, sciences.”  Id. ch. V, § 2, reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 181, at 1907; accord N.H. CONST. of 1784 pt. 2, reprinted in 
4 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 181, at 2467 (“[I]t shall be the duty of 
the legislators and magistrates . . . to encourage private and public institutions, rewards and 
immunities for the promotion of agriculture, arts, sciences . . . .”); see also GA. CONST. of 1798 
art. IV, § 13, reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS: COLONIAL CHARTERS, 
AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR 
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constitutional provisions recognized broad objectives and did not prescribe 
how these institutions of learning should encourage or promote the arts and 
sciences.  The Copyright Clause should enjoy this same breadth. 
4. “The Progress of Science” and Early Supreme Court Cases 
The Supreme Court at one time flirted with the idea that the term “science” 
in the Copyright Clause had some significant limiting force.  In dicta in the 
well-known case of Baker v. Selden,186 the Court quoted and cited with 
approval language from Clayton v. Stone & Hall,187 a circuit court decision, 
suggesting that there could be no copyright protection for a newspaper 
reporting “the state of the market.”188  The language of Clayton cited the 
Copyright Clause and noted that the purpose of the copyright act was the 
promotion of science.189  Moreover, 
it would certainly be a pretty extraordinary view of the sciences to consider a 
daily or weekly publication of the state of the market as falling within any 
class of of them. . . .  The term “science” cannot, with any propriety, be applied 
to a work of so fluctuating and fugitive a form as that of a newspaper or price-
current, the subject-matter of which is daily changing, and is of mere 
temporary use.190 
Based in part upon this interpretation of the Copyright Clause, the court in 
Clayton concluded that the “price-current” or newspaper at issue could not be 
considered a “book” within the meaning of the Copyright Act of 1790.191  
Another theme in Clayton was that the price-current was an item of utility and 
the result of the plaintiffs’ industry, but not a work of science, nor connected 
with learning.192 
Twelve years after Baker, in 1891, the Supreme Court in Higgins v. 
Keuffel193 picked up on a similar theme when it held that mere product labels 
could not qualify for copyright protection.  Such labels, it reasoned, had no 
value separate from the articles upon which they were attached, “and no 
possible influence upon science or the useful arts.”194  The Court held that in 
 
HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 801 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 
William S. Hein & Co. 1993) (1906) (“The arts and sciences shall be promoted, in one or more 
seminaries of learning . . . .”). 
 186. 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
 187. 5 F. Cas. 999 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2,872). 
 188. Baker, 101 U.S. at 105–06. 
 189. Id. at 105 (quoting Clayton, 5 F. Cas. at 1003). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Clayton, 5 F. Cas. at 1003; accord Baker, 101 U.S. at 105–06 (quoting Clayton, 5 F. Cas. 
at 1003). 
 192. Clayton, 5 F. Cas. at 1003. 
 193. 140 U.S. 428 (1891). 
 194. Id. at 431. 
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order to qualify for copyright protection, an “article” had to serve “some 
purpose other than as a mere advertisement.”195  Although Higgins can be 
justified on the ground that the label lacked originality or contained 
unprotectable ideas, the language of the opinion was not so limited.  Higgins 
suggested that copyrightability was dependent upon whether a particular work 
seeking protection actually promoted the progress of science in some 
identifiable manner. 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in J.L. Mott Iron Works v. Clow,196 
followed Baker and Higgins in holding that a price catalogue with illustrations, 
dimensions, and price listings did not qualify for copyright protection because 
it was a mere advertisement and, as such, failed to advance literature, science, 
or art.197  The court noted that under the Constitution, Congress’s power was 
“restricted to the promotion of the progress of science and useful arts.”198 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Courier Lithographing Co. v. 
Donaldson Lithographing Co.,199 attempted to follow Higgins when it held that 
chromolithographic prints created as advertising posters for a circus did not 
qualify for copyright protection.200  The court held that with “no other use than 
that of a mere advertisement, and no value aside from this function, it would 
not be promotive of the useful arts, within the meaning of the constitutional 
provision.”201  On appeal to the Supreme Court, Justice Holmes, in Bleistein v. 
Donaldson Lithographing Co.,202 reversed and put to rest the idea that pictures 
used exclusively for advertisements were ineligible for copyright protection.203  
Justice Holmes, while never mentioning Higgins, balked at the suggestion that 
courts should or could do a qualitative analysis of the aesthetic or educational 
value of works.204  Since Bleistein, the courts have not looked back.205 
 
 195. Id. 
 196. 82 F. 316 (7th Cir. 1897). 
 197. Id. at 321. 
 198. Id. at 320. 
 199. 104 F. 993 (6th Cir. 1900), rev’d sub nom. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 
188 U.S. 239 (1903). 
 200. Courier Lithographing, 104 F. at 995–97. 
 201. Id. at 996; see also id. (“[H]aving no intrinsic value other than its function as an 
advertisement, [it] must be equally without the obvious meaning of the constitution.”). 
 202. 188 U.S. 239 (1903). 
 203. Id. at 251–52. 
 204. Id.; see also Griesedieck W. Brewery Co. v. Peoples Brewing Co., 56 F. Supp. 600, 606 
(D. Minn. 1944) (contrasting Higgins with Bleistein and following Bleistein’s “more liberal 
rule”). 
 205. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345, 348 (1991) (not 
necessarily construing the “to promote” phrase, but holding that the Constitution requires only a 
very low level of creativity to qualify for copyright protection). 
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5. CTEA: Promoting the Progress of Science 
Under this broad view of the “to promote” phrase, the CTEA satisfies the 
constitutional requirement.  First, the CTEA directly relates to copyright 
protection,206 and it leaves intact the basic protections and requirements of 
copyright law.  The 1976 Act, as amended by the CTEA, continues to provide 
a system of incentives for the creation of works for limited times and permits, 
within limits, public use of and access to those works. 
Applying a more restrictive approach, which would require that the CTEA 
itself promote the progress of science, the CTEA still survives scrutiny.  It 
harmonized United States copyright law with European Union law by 
synchronizing the terms of many American and European copyrights.  Under 
an EU Council directive, member states were required to establish a copyright 
term “for the life of the author and for 70 years after his death.”207  By 
extending the term of American copyrights from the life of the author plus fifty 
years to the life of the author plus seventy years,208 Congress believed it was 
maintaining the United States as a leader in intellectual property protection and 
consequently in creation of works.209  The statements made by members of 
Congress and others emphasized this justification.210  The Register of 
Copyrights, Marybeth Peters, in testimony before Congress strongly supported 
passage of the CTEA211 and stated emphatically: “The Copyright Office 
believes harmonization of the world’s copyright laws is imperative if there is 
 
 206. If a non-germane amendment, addressing an issue unrelated to copyright—say providing 
crop subsidies—were attached to the Copyright Act, Congress would need to have authority for 
that provision from some constitutional provision other than the Copyright Clause. 
 207. Council Directive 93/98/EEC, art. 1, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9 (EC). 
 208. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000). 
 209. This was not the first time Congress had relied upon this rationale for adopting copyright 
legislation.  In 1830, the House Report in support of the 1831 Act spoke of the need for the 
United States to be “foremost among nations in encouraging science and literature” but lamented 
that based on the term of copyright protection afforded in the United States, it was “very far 
behind them all.”  H.R. REP. No. 3, at 1 (1830), reprinted in U.S. Cong. Serial Set 210 (1830).  
The report recommended passage of the bill extending the original term of copyright from 
fourteen to twenty-eight years.  Id. at 2. 
 210. See, e.g.,  The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 483 Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 4 (1995) [hereinafter S. Hearings] (statement of Sen. 
Feinstein citing harmonization as “[p]erhaps the most compelling reason” for the CTEA); id. at 7, 
20, 22 (statement of Register of Copyrights, Marybeth Peters, pointing to need to harmonize 
copyright terms and need for United States to be a leader in copyright protection); S. REP. NO. 
104–315, at 3 (1996) (Senate report stating reasons for the CTEA). 
 211. S. Hearings, supra note 210, at 22 (revealing that the Copyright Office “strongly 
support[ed]” enactment of the CTEA).  Perhaps Ms. Peters is having second thoughts.  She 
recently acknowledged that “the merits [of the CTEA] in terms of copyright principles were 
slim.”  Marybeth Peters, Copyright Enters the Public Domain: The 33rd Donald C. Brace 
Memorial Lecture Delivered at New York University School of Law on Apr. 29, 2004, 51 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 701, 710 (2004). 
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to be an orderly exploitation of copyrighted works.”212  In the face of such 
testimony it is difficult to find that Congress did not act reasonably to promote 
the progress of science by enacting the CTEA. 
The more relevant question is not whether implementing longer terms for 
copyrights increased harmony with European law, but whether increasing 
terms for existing copyrights either increased harmony with European law or 
otherwise promoted the progress of science.  The CTEA’s retroactive 
extension of copyright terms is consistent with the European approach, which 
also required retroactive extension of copyright terms.213  If harmonizing 
United States copyright law with European law is a valid justification for the 
CTEA, then it is a small step to find that harmonizing United States copyright 
law with itself by synchronizing existing copyright terms with future copyright 
terms is also valid justification.  Testimony before Congress also supported a 
finding that extension of existing copyrights would encourage investment in 
restoration and public distribution of existing works with aged copyrights.214 
C. Limits of the Copyright Clause 
1. Originality requirement 
Article I, section 8, clause 8 empowers Congress to provide copyright and 
patent protections, but it does impose some limits on Congress’s power to 
legislate in the copyright area.  Perhaps foremost is the requirement of 
originality.  Although originality is not expressly identified in the Copyright 
Clause, courts have found the requirement implicit in the terms “authors” and 
“writings.”215  In 1879, the “authors” and “writings” limitations were 
controlling in The Trade-Mark Cases,216 where the Supreme Court held that 
the Copyright Clause could not support trademark legislation because 
trademarks were neither writings of authors nor discoveries of inventors.217  
 
 212. S. Hearings, supra note 210, at 20. 
 213. The EU directive required that the new copyright term applied to “all works” protected 
in any Member State on July 1, 1995.  Council Directive 93/98/EEC, arts. 10(2), 13, 1993 O.J. (L 
290) 9 (EC); see also Written Question No. 841/98, 1998 O.J. (C 323) 82 (stating that art. 10(2) 
requirement “has led to a resurrection of rights in some Member States”). 
 214. See Hatch & Lee, supra note 6, at 16–20 (discussing congressional testimony and this 
justification). 
 215. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346–47 (1991); see also 
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57–58 (1884) (defining author as “he to 
whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker; one who completes a work of science or 
literature” and holding that the Constitution is broad enough to cover photographs “so far as they 
are representatives of original intellectual conceptions of the author”).  The Eldred petitioners 
argued that the originality requirement relates to the “promote the Progress of Science” 
requirement.  See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 11, at 20–21. 
 216. 100 U.S. 82 (1879). 
 217. Id. at 93–94. 
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During the same term, Baker v. Selden218 recognized that copyright 
fundamentally did not extend to ideas or useful knowledge contained in 
protected works.219  Shortly thereafter, in 1884, in Burrow-Giles Lithographics 
Co. v. Sarony,220 the Supreme Court considered a constitutional question which 
was “not free from difficulty”—whether photographs were writings of authors 
within the meaning of the Copyright Clause.221  The Court concluded that 
photographs could qualify “so far as they are representatives of original 
intellectual conceptions of the author.”222  In 1891, in Higgins v. Keuffel,223 the 
Court on constitutional grounds refused copyright protection for merely 
descriptive ink bottle labels.  The Court found that the labels lacked any value 
as compositions and communicated nothing more than the contents of the 
bottles.224  The holding in Higgins could be understood to mean that the labels 
were not protectable because they lacked original expression. 
More recently, in 1991, the Court in Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone 
Service Co.225 enforced the originality requirement to hold that typical 
telephone book white pages were not subject to copyright protection.226  
Although the 1976 Act codifies the originality requirement,227 the courts 
recognize that originality is a constitutional requirement.228 
The Eldred petitioners, citing Feist, argued that extension of existing 
copyrights violated the originality requirement.229  They argued that “whenever 
congress extends to an ‘Author’ an ‘exclusive Right,’ that grant too must be 
tested for originality.”230  Under this view, an existing work, already protected 
by statutory copyright, could no longer be original for any subsequent 
 
 218. 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
 219. Baker does not clearly state that its holding was driven by the Copyright Clause.  Baker, 
however, quoted with approval language from Clayton v. Stone & Hall, 5 F. Cas. 999 
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829), which explicitly relied upon the Copyright Clause.  101 U.S. at 105. 
 220. 111 U.S. 53 (1884). 
 221. Id. at 56. 
 222. Id. at 58.  Other cases have discussed the originality requirement.  See Bleistein v. 
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249–50 (1903) (discussing originality requirement); 
Alfred Bell & Co., Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 101–03 (2d Cir. 1951) (discussing 
originality requirement). 
 223. 140 U.S. 428 (1891). 
 224. Id. at 433. 
 225. 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 226. Id. at 363–64. 
 227. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of 
authorship”). 
 228. E.g., Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 346–47; Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 
U.S. 53, 58, 61 (1884); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 100–01 (2d Cir. 
1951). 
 229. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 210 (2003); Brief for Petitioners, supra note 11, at 
32–33. 
 230. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 11, at 33. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
340 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:307 
copyright extension or grant.  The theory appears to suggest that once a work 
receives statutory copyright protection by virtue of being an original work, or 
the work passes into the public domain for any reason, it has exhausted its 
originality.  This argument is inconsistent with the practice of the First 
Congress when, under the authority of the Copyright Clause, it enacted the 
1790 Act.  The 1790 Act granted copyright protection to existing and even 
published works.231  Neither Congress nor the Framers recognized a 
constitutional problem by granting copyright protection to existing works or 
works already protected by state copyrights. 
The originality requirement is derivative of the “authors” and “writings” 
requirements232 and should not be divorced from them or be permitted to 
expand broadly, untethered from the text of the Copyright Clause.  An 
individual is genuinely an author when he or she includes an original 
contribution (“creative spark”)233 as part of the work.  That individual is no 
less an author of the work with the passage of time, publication, or upon 
procurement of statutory copyright protection; a work continues to be original 
in the sense required by Feist.  More fundamentally, changes to the scope or 
term of existing copyrights should not require consideration of the originality 
requirement.  Any other rule would place copyright in a straitjacket, incapable 
of any alteration after the interest first arose, and could lead to the specter of 
multiple copyrights governed by different standards depending upon when a 
copyright interest first arose.  The Copyright Clause does not and should not 
impose such a requirement. 
2. Limited Times Requirement 
a. Limited Times Copyrights in America: A Conscious Decision 
Another limitation in the Copyright Clause, and of particular relevance to 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, is the limited times restriction.234  At the time of the 
framing of the Constitution, the idea of limited term copyrights had strong 
 
 231. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (1790); see also supra notes 150–63 and 
accompanying text. 
 232. The Eldred petitioners argued that the originality requirement is based not only on 
“authors” and “writings,” but also on the “promote the Progress of Science” requirement.  Brief 
for Petitioners, supra note 11, at 20–21; accord WALTERSCHEID, supra note 171, at 396–97 
(originality standard of Feist incorporates creativity standard derived from the “to promote the 
Progress of Science” clause). 
 233. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 211. 
 234. The Supreme Court has never invoked this limitation, but it has recognized it.  See 
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (acknowledging “limited 
copyright duration required by the Constitution”); see also Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (1 Pet.) 
1, 16–17 (1829) (patent case noting that the clause contemplates exclusive rights for a limited 
period determined by Congress). 
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historical precedent and support.  Under the English copyright act, the Statute 
of Anne of 1710, copyrights lasted for fourteen years from publication “and no 
longer,”235 with the potential for an additional fourteen year renewal term if the 
author was then living.236  When the Continental Congress called for state 
copyright laws in 1783, it called for copyright protection “for a certain 
time.”237  All the early state copyright laws were for limited terms.238 
The fact that American statutory copyrights were for limited terms was not 
by happenstance. The genesis of limited term copyrights likely was rooted in a 
desire to avoid unnecessary monopolies in printing.239  Prior to the Statute of 
Anne of 1710 in England, the Stationers’ Company, a powerful trade group 
sanctioned by royal charter and legislation,240 created a system of private 
perpetual copyrights.241  By this system of copyrights, the Stationers enjoyed a 
powerful monopoly in the book trade.  As part of the debate in the late 
seventeenth century, John Locke complained about the impact of the 
Stationers’ monopoly and advocated for, at most, limited term copyrights. 
That any person or company should have patents for the sole printing of 
ancient authors is very unreasonable and injurious to learning; and for those 
who purchase copies from authors that now live and write, it may be 
reasonable to limit their property to a certain number of years after the death of 
 
 235. Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c.19, § I (1710) (Eng.). 
 236. Id. § XI. 
 237. 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 326–27 (Gaillard Hunt 
ed., Government Printing Office 1922) (reporting text of resolution). 
 238. The terms varied.  Most, like the Statute of Anne, provided for an original term of 
fourteen years followed by a renewal term of fourteen years.  See COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, 
supra note 55, at 1–21 (acts of Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, 
Pennsylvania, and South Carolina).  Others varied from as short as fourteen years, id. at 15 (North 
Carolina), to as long as twenty-one years, id. at 9, 14 (Rhode Island, Virginia). 
 239. Professor Thomas B. Nachbar rejects the position that the Copyright Clause reflected the 
Framers’ alleged abhorrence of monopolies.  See Nachbar, supra note 62, at 329–49.  Professor 
Nachbar’s thesis, however, focuses on the broader point that the Constitution does not evince a 
generally applicable norm against grants of monopolies or exclusive rights.  See id.  The thesis 
here is that the history of statutory copyright, dating back to the Statute of Anne, had 
antimonopoly origins, and those origins carried through as a basis for copyright theory in 
America.  English statutory copyright law, spawned by the bad experience with the Stationers’ 
Company’s printing monopoly, coupled with Madison’s own undeniable distaste for monopolies, 
likely were behind the “limited Times” phrase of the Copyright Clause. 
 240. See Licensing Act, 14 Car. 2, c. 33 (1662) (Eng.); 1 A TRANSCRIPT OF THE REGISTERS 
OF THE COMPANY OF STATIONERS OF LONDON; 1554–1640 A.D., at xxviii–xxxii (Edward Arber 
ed., Peter Smith 1950) (1875) [hereinafter TRANSCRIPT OF STATIONERS] (reproducing the text 
and translation of the 1557 charter). 
 241. See generally Dallon, supra note 10, at 391–402 (discussing history of Stationers’ 
Company and its system of private copyright); 1 & 2 TRANSCRIPT OF STATIONERS, supra note 
240 (providing history and records of the Stationers’ Company). 
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the author, or the first printing of the book, as, suppose, fifty or seventy 
years.242 
Eventually, in 1694, Parliament refused to renew the Licensing Act, which had 
allowed the Stationers to monopolize the book trade.  The House of Commons 
objected to renewal of the Licensing Act, because under the Act “said 
Company are impowered to hinder the printing all innocent and useful Books,” 
and printing of “the Classick Authors,” and “a great Number of the best 
Books” had been “monopolized by the Company of Stationers.”243 
Later, in 1710, Parliament enacted the Statute of Anne and terminated 
perpetual copyrights for published works by imposing limited terms upon both 
the existing private copyrights and future copyrights under the statute.244  The 
Stationers continued to press their case for perpetual copyrights in the courts 
until finally in 1774, the House of Lords rejected post-Statute of Anne 
perpetual common law copyrights in Donaldson v. Beckett.245 
Madison and Jefferson were opponents of monopolies, but Madison, for 
his part, was willing to accept copyrights and patents as limited monopolies 
necessary to encourage literary works and discoveries.246  Madison in his 
correspondence with Jefferson in 1788 agreed that monopolies were “among 
the greatest nusances [sic] in Government.”247  On a later occasion Madison 
wrote that monopolies should only be “granted with caution, and guarded with 
strictness against abuse.”248  Concerning copyrights and patents, however, 
“[t]here can be no just objection to a temporary monopoly in these cases; but it 
ought to be temporary because under that limitation a sufficient recompence 
[sic] and encouragement may be given.”249  Supreme Court Justice and legal 
scholar Joseph Story in 1833 explained that the public benefits from limited 
 
 242. LORD KING, THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOHN LOCKE 208 (Burt Franklin ed., Garland 
Pubs. 1972) (1884). 
 243. 11 H.C. JOUR. 306 (1695). 
 244. Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c.19, § I (1710) (Eng.) (providing a term of twenty-one years 
for existing copyrights and two fourteen-year terms for future copyrights). 
 245. 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L. 1774).  Donaldson held that even if a perpetual common law 
copyright had existed, it was preempted by the Statute of Anne. Id. at 844–47. 
 246. See Letter from Madison to Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 1 THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS: 
THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON 1776–1826, at 
562, 566 (James Morton Smith ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1995) (“With regard to Monopolies they 
are justly classed among the greatest nusances [sic] in Government.  But is it clear that as 
encouragements to literary works and ingenious discoveries, they are not too valuable to be 
wholly renounced?”). 
 247. Id. 
 248. James Madison, Aspects of Monopoly One Hundred Years Ago, 128 HARPER’S 
MAGAZINE, March 1914, at 489, 490 (publishing Madison’s previously unpublished essay). 
 249. Id. 
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term copyrights because “after a short interval,” the people have “full 
possession and enjoyment” of the writings “without restraint.”250 
Prior to the Constitution, the concept of perpetual copyright had been 
advocated for in England.  As late as 1774, in Donaldson v. Beckett,251 
proponents of perpetual copyright were pressing their case.  Noah Webster, 
one of the early American advocates for copyright protection,252 preferred 
perpetual copyrights.  Several years after ratification of the Constitution, 
Webster opined that he did “not see the reason why an interest in original 
literary composition should stand on different ground from all other personal 
property,” and he puzzled over why “[m]en are strangely influenced by habits” 
into believing that property in literary compositions “should be held only for a 
limited time, while a horse or an acre of land . . . is a permanent inheritable 
estate.”253 
The Framers, by including the “limited Times” phrase in the Copyright 
Clause, unambiguously rejected the idea of perpetual statutory copyrights.  In 
the historical context where perpetual copyright was a familiar but rejected 
concept, it was no surprise that the Framers accepted the prevailing view of the 
time and opted for limited duration copyrights. 
b. Perpetual Copyright on “The Installment Plan”? 
The petitioners in Eldred argued that the “blanket” term extension in the 
CTEA for existing copyrights violated the limited times requirement.254  
However, petitioners did not claim that the CTEA’s lengthened copyright 
terms for works created in the future violated the limited times requirement.255  
Rather, under petitioners’ view, only retroactive copyright term extensions 
were suspect.  The Court rejected the petitioners’ argument by resorting to the 
dictionary definition of “limited” and Congress’s historical practice of 
retroactive extensions.256 
 
 250. 3 STORY, supra note 91, § 1147. 
 251. 1 Eng. Rep. 847 (H.L. 1774). 
 252. Noah Webster was one of the first advocates for copyright protection in America.  
Before the time of the Constitution he lobbied the individual states for copyright laws.  See 
HARRY R. WARFEL, NOAH WEBSTER: SCHOOLMASTER TO AMERICA 58 (1936) (“Webster 
unquestionably is the father of copyright legislation in America.”). 
 253. Letter from Webster to Simeon Baldwin (Dec. 1803), in LETTERS OF NOAH WEBSTER, 
supra note 149, at 253, 254; see also Letter from Webster to John Pickering (Dec. 1816), in 
LETTERS OF NOAH WEBSTER, supra note 149, at 341, 383–86 (arguing that copyright is not a 
monopoly, but property which should be for permanent enjoyment of author’s heirs). 
 254. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 11, at 18. 
 255. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199 (2003) (“petitioners concede” that life plus 70 
years for future copyrights qualifies as limited time); Brief for Petitioners, supra note 11, at 14 
(“Whether 50 years is enough, or 70 years too much, is not a judgment meet for this Court.”). 
 256. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199–204. 
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Opponents of the CTEA and the Eldred petitioners both recognized the 
danger with retroactive term extensions—perpetual copyrights on the 
installment plan.257  Under the Court’s approach, a twenty-year extension of an 
existing limited term is still “confine[d] within certain bounds.”258  The 
problem is that under this view, any copyright term extension for a set number 
of years would satisfy this requirement, and each time copyrights were about to 
expire, Congress could tack on another extension with no clear end in sight.259  
The Court acknowledged this risk, but noted that the CTEA did not present the 
situation of a string of lengthy extensions attempting to avoid the limited times 
requirement.260 
The Court also found a lack of evidence that Congress intended the CTEA 
as a step toward perpetual copyright.261  The challenge with this approach is 
that it encourages unspoken motives; careful witnesses and legislators need 
only pay lip service to the limited times requirement to avoid a constitutional 
conflict.  Members and witnesses may even speak supportively of perpetual 
copyrights without causing a problem.  The Court rejected Justice Breyer’s 
dissenting citation to members of Congress who viewed the CTEA as a step in 
the right direction toward perpetual copyright.262  In the Court’s view, these 
“scattered statements” cited by Justice Breyer were not the sort of legislative 
history “accord[ed] high value.”263 
The EU Council directive requiring European Union member states to 
adopt copyright terms for life of the author plus seventy years264 was a major 
motivation—and for many the single most important motivation—for 
congressional support of the CTEA.265  The EU directive lends strong support 
 
 257. In testimony before Congress, Professor Peter Jaszi warned that some might believe that 
the CTEA “represents a downpayment on perpetual copyright on the installment plan.”  S. 
Hearing, supra note 210, at 72 (statement of Peter A. Jaszi). 
 258. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199 (alteration in original) (quoting S. JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF 
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (7th ed. 1785)). 
 259. Professor Thomas Lee has picked up on this theme and analyzed his own hypothetical 
“Marshall Mathers Copyright Term Extension Act of 2020,” which he forecasts undoubtedly will 
be proposed in some form in the future.  Thomas R. Lee, Eldred v. Ashcroft and the 
(Hypothetical) Copyright Term Extension Act of 2020, 12 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 12 (2003).  
He concludes that “[a]ll indications are that there will be a ‘next time,’” noting the powerful 
lobbying interests behind the 1998 CTEA.  Id.  Professor Lee concludes that his best guess is that 
such an extension of 30 years would likely survive a constitutional challenge under Eldred.  Id. at 
22. 
 260. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 208–09. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 209 n.16; see also id. at 256 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing members of Congress). 
 263. Id. at 209 n.16 (majority opinion). 
 264. Council Directive 93/98/EEC, art. 1, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9 (EC). 
 265. See, e.g., S. Hearings, supra note 210, at 4 (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein, a 
cosponsor of the CTEA, that harmonization with European law was “[p]erhaps the most 
compelling reason” for the CTEA); id. at 1–2 (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, citing economic 
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for the view that most members of Congress were not attempting to institute 
perpetual copyright protection; instead, they were motivated by competitive 
and economic concerns.  Copyright terms for the life of the author plus seventy 
years, and in the case of works made for hire for ninety-five or one hundred 
and twenty years, are literally for limited times. 
III.  LIMITED JUDICIAL REVIEW FOR THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE 
Applying an originalist approach, a court should consider both the 
Framers’ intent concerning the Copyright Clause itself and their intent 
regarding judicial review of congressional acts.  To be true to the Framers’ 
intentions, there are two pertinent questions.  First, would the Framers have 
viewed the CTEA as consistent with the power granted by the Copyright 
Clause?  Second, assuming the CTEA is inconsistent with the grant in the 
Copyright Clause, would the Framers have intended that a court strike down 
the CTEA? 
A. Courts Read the Grant of Authority Under the Copyright Clause Broadly 
In construing the Copyright Clause, the Supreme Court has read the clause 
liberally,266 and Eldred is a continuation of the Court’s earlier precedents.  In 
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, the Court read the clause broadly to 
hold that photographs were “writings” of “authors” within the constitutional 
meaning of the clause.267  In Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,268 the 
Court held that “a mere advertisement”269 was subject to protection under the 
Constitution and the prevailing copyright act.270  In Kalem Co. v. Harper 
Brothers, the Court held that a movie dramatization of scenes depicted in the 
novel Ben Hur infringed the plaintiff’s copyright and did not violate the 
Copyright Clause by extending protection to ideas.271  In Mazer v. Stein, the 
 
and trade disadvantages with Europe without the CTEA); ORRIN G. HATCH, COPYRIGHT TERM 
EXTENSION ACT OF 1996, S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 3 (1996) (stating purpose of CTEA was “to 
ensure adequate copyright protection for American works in foreign nations and the continued 
economic benefits of a healthy surplus balance of trade in the exploitation of copyrighted works” 
and citing “significant trade benefits” through harmonizing U.S. copyright law with European 
law). 
 266. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 560, 561 (1973) (noting that terms “writings” and 
“authors” “have not been construed in their narrow literal sense but, rather, with the reach 
necessary to reflect the broad scope of constitutional principles”); Fargo Mercantile Co. v. 
Brechet & Richter Co., 295 F. 823, 826 (8th Cir. 1924) (noting courts’ liberal construction of 
Copyright Clause). 
 267. 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884). 
 268. 188 U.S. 239 (1903). 
 269. Id. at 252 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 270. Id. (majority opinion). 
 271. 222 U.S. 55, 63 (1911). 
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Supreme Court assumed, as did the parties, that the creator of a picture or a 
statue was an “author” within the meaning of the Copyright Clause.272 
These cases broadly construing the Copyright Clause are weighed against 
the holdings enforcing limitations of the clause beginning with the Trade-Mark 
Cases,273 Baker v. Selden,274 Higgins v. Keuffel,275 and more recently in Feist 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.276  These cases are rooted in 
the principle that copyright protection does not extend to ideas, facts, or other 
works lacking originality.  Yet, even these opinions in some measure signaled 
a broad interpretation of the Copyright Clause.  The Trade-Mark Cases 
acknowledged that the word “writings” in the clause is “liberally construed.”277  
Baker, although holding ideas beyond the reach of copyright protection, 
recognized the basic doctrine that the copyright in a book is valid “without 
regard to the novelty, or want of novelty, of its subject-matter.”278  In Feist, the 
Court held that the constitutional requirement of originality is satisfied by only 
an “extremely low” level of creativity, and emphasized that copyright 
protection may exist for compilations of facts.279  These cases demonstrate that 
the Court has construed the Copyright Clause liberally and implicitly afforded 
broad discretion to Congress to legislate in the area of copyrights.  Other courts 
have followed the Supreme Court’s lead and have construed the language of 
the Copyright Clause liberally.  For example, courts have assumed, seemingly 
without hesitation, that various works including computer programs, fabric 
designs, belt buckles, and architectural structures are “writings” in the 
constitutional sense.280 
 
 272. 347 U.S. 201, 208 (1954).  But see id. at 219–21 (Douglas, J., concurring) (questioning 
whether sculptor is an “author” or a statue a “writing,” and urging reargument to consider the 
“important constitutional question”). 
 273. 100 U.S. 82 (1879). 
 274. 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
 275. 140 U.S. 428 (1891). 
 276. 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 277. 100 U.S. at 94; accord Higgins, 140 U.S. at 431 (quoting Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 
94). 
 278. 101 U.S. at 102. 
 279. 499 U.S. at 345. 
 280. See, e.g., Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 762–63 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(recognizing and discussing copyright protection for fabric designs); Apple Computer, Inc. v. 
Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1248 (3d Cir. 1983) (recognizing that computer 
programs are afforded copyright protection as literary works); Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories By 
Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 994 (2d Cir. 1980) (upholding copyright protection for ornamental belt 
buckles); Yankee Candle Co. v. New England Candle Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 154, 158 (D. Mass. 
1998) (recognizing copyright protection in architectural structures); see also United States v. 
Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting “the term ‘Writings’ has been 
interpreted so broadly as to include much more than writings in the literal sense, or the lay 
definition of the word”). 
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In Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,281 a case 
cited by the Court in Eldred,282 the Court explained its position: “As the text of 
the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress that has been assigned the task of 
defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to 
authors . . . in order to give the public appropriate access to their work 
product.”283  The Court has been willing to read the clause broadly and to 
otherwise afford Congress flexibility when legislating in the area of copyrights.  
The Court’s decision in Eldred is consistent with the Court’s historically 
deferential approach to congressional copyright enactments; a stricter reading 
of the Copyright Clause would have been a departure from the Court’s prior 
cases. 
B. The Framers Intended Limited Judicial Review 
There has been extensive debate over the scope, and early on even the 
validity, of judicial review of congressional enactments.  Although individual 
Framers had many different views, it appears that the prevailing view among 
the leading Framers was that the Constitution supported at least some level of 
judicial review of congressional acts.284  Nevertheless, the early evidence 
supports a practice of only limited, deferential judicial review of congressional 
enactments.  Professors Paul M. Schwartz and William Michael Treanor make 
the case that under the Constitution generally, and the Copyright Clause in 
particular, “the original understanding would be that the standard of judicial 
review is a very deferential one,”285 and note that “the scholarly orthodoxy is 
 
 281. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 282. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 204–05 (2003). 
 283. 464 U.S. at 429; see also Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990) (“[I]t is not our 
role to alter the delicate balance Congress has labored to achieve.”); Goldstein v. California, 412 
U.S. 546, 562 (1973) (noting that under the Copyright Clause “the area in which Congress may 
act is broad”); Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530 (1972) (patent case; 
“The direction of Art. I is that Congress shall have the power to promote the progress of science 
and the useful arts.  When, as here, the Constitution is permissive, the sign of how far Congress 
has chosen to go can come only from Congress.”). 
 284. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: ITS LEGAL AND 
HISTORICAL BASIS AND OTHER ESSAYS 10–11 (reprint 1963) (1914) (identifying specific leading 
Framers who understood the Constitution to provide for judicial review of congressional acts); 
DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 
1789–1888, at 70 (1985) (noting that, at the Convention, members “recognized that the courts 
would review the validity of congressional legislation”); SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW 
AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 38–39 (1990) (noting limited discussion of judicial review 
in the Constitutional Convention and concluding that of those who spoke about it, more supported 
it than denied it). 
 285. Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term 
Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 2331, 2374 
(2003). 
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that the original understanding was that courts deferred to Congress and 
legislatures unless a statute’s unconstitutionality was clear.”286 
If what the Framers intended by the Copyright Clause is to be controlling 
of its construction today, that intent must be taken in the broader context of 
their views of judicial review.  Understanding that the Framers intended only 
very limited review over the constitutionality of congressional enactments, the 
Supreme Court was correct in upholding the CTEA, which at a minimum does 
not clearly violate the Copyright Clause. 
IV.  PROBLEMS WITH THE ELDRED RATIONALE 
This Article takes the position that the outcome in Eldred likely did 
comport with the original intentions of the Framers; the Framers intended that 
Congress have broad discretion in enacting copyright laws and likely would 
have approved even retroactive extension of copyrights to improve the 
international competitive and economic position of the United States and its 
copyright owners.  The Eldred opinion also recognized the Court’s limited 
constitutional role in review of copyright laws.  That role permits the people’s 
elected representatives to make policy decisions and pass laws with intrusion 
only when absolutely necessary to enforce the people’s expressed will in the 
Constitution. 
The Eldred opinion, however, did open itself to some criticism.  First, the 
Court unnecessarily elevated the private interest rationale of copyright to a 
status equal with the public interest rationale of copyright.  Second, the Court 
failed to reject outright the “quid pro quo” requirement suggested by the 
petitioners.  Third, the Court’s reliance on Congress’s history of copyright 
extensions is problematic. 
A. The Public Interest Rationale for Copyright Protection 
From the earliest history of copyright protection there have been two 
competing rationales for copyright protection—a public interest rationale and a 
private interest rationale.287  The public interest rationale focuses on benefits to 
the public by encouraging availability of works to the public.  The private 
interest rationale focuses on benefits to individual authors or copyright holders.  
In decisions prior to Eldred, the Court consistently reaffirmed the preeminence 
 
 286. Id. at 2371; see also Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 175 (1796) (Chase, J.) 
(“[I]f the court have such power, I am free to declare, that I will never exercise it, but in a very 
clear case.”); SNOWISS, supra note 284, at 36, 60 (noting that during the period prior to Marbury 
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), judicial review was “reserved for the concededly 
unconstitutional act”). 
 287. See generally Dallon, supra note 10 (discussing public interest and private interest 
rationales). 
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of the public interest rationale for copyrights.288  In Feist Publications, Inc. v. 
Rural Telephone Service Co., the Court stated that “[t]he primary objective of 
copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but ‘[t]o promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts.’”289  In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., the Court stated: “The monopoly privileges that Congress may 
authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special 
private benefit.  Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important 
public purpose may be achieved.”290  In United States v. Paramount Pictures, 
Inc., the Court recognized that “copyright law . . . makes reward to the owner a 
secondary consideration.”291  These pronouncements are consistent with the 
language of the Copyright Clause itself, which explicitly focuses on the public 
benefits of copyright protection in its “To promote the Progress of Science” 
language.292  The 1790 Act also focused on the public interest rationale.293 
Adoption of the public interest rationale by the Framers and the First 
Congress likely was a calculated decision.  The state copyright acts adopted 
from 1783 to 1786 had a strong flavor of the private interest rationale,294 but 
the Framers chose not to include any reference to the private interest rationale 
in the Constitution.  The 1790 Act is likewise devoid of reference to the private 
interest rationale. 
 Eldred in lengthy footnote 18 is critical of the dissenters’ reliance upon the 
public interest rationale.295  The opinion claims that Justice Stevens 
“understates” the relationship between reward to authors and the progress of 
science, and Justice Breyer  “misses the mark” when he asserts that “copyright 
 
 288. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 519–20 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(primary purpose is not to reward authors; private motivation must promote public availability of 
works); Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 524–26 (1994) (copyright must ultimately serve 
public good); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“[P]rivate 
motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, 
music, and the other arts.”); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (reward to copyright 
owners is secondary); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (“The sole interest of 
the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits 
derived by the public from the labors of authors.”). 
 289. 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991). 
 290. 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
 291. 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948). 
 292. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 293. The Act was entitled “An Act for the encouragement of learning . . . .”  Copyright Act of 
1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790). 
 294. For example, the Connecticut copyright statute stated: “[I]t is perfectly agreeable to the 
principles of natural equity and justice, that every author should be secured in receiving the 
profits that may arise from the sale of his works . . . .”  COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 55, 
at 1.  The North Carolina copyright statute began: “Whereas nothing is more strictly a man’s own 
than the fruit of his study . . . .”  Id. at 15. 
 295. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003). 
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statutes must serve public, not private, ends.”296  According to the Court, 
“copyright law celebrates the profit motive,”297 and “[r]ewarding authors” and 
promoting progress are “complementary.”298  Finally, the Court concluded, the 
public end and the private end “are not mutually exclusive.”299 
The Court also found that the CTEA enjoyed a rational basis and promoted 
the progress of science in part because of demographic, economic, and 
technological changes, and because “longer terms would encourage copyright 
holders to invest in the restoration and public distribution of their works.”300  
The demographic, economic, and technological changes argument at heart is 
only a private interest justification.  The argument was that in view of 
increased human longevity and the pattern of starting families later in life, the 
term life plus fifty years did not adequately provide for an author’s 
descendants.301  This argument, although framed in terms of increased 
incentives for authors to create works, had little to do with incentives302 and 
much to do with the private interests of maintaining revenue streams to non-
author copyright successors.303  One is hard pressed to claim that by 
retroactively lengthening the term of an existing copyright, there is an 
increased incentive to the author of the existing work (who may or may not 
continue to be the copyright holder). 
Encouraging restoration and public distribution of existing works, on the 
other hand, would serve the public interest rationale.  The difficulty is that the 
forces behind the CTEA had in mind preventing restoration and public 
distribution of copyrighted works by petitioners and others.  Also, this 
argument would support perpetual copyright; a copyright holder will always 
have greater incentive to invest in a work so long as the copyright monopoly 
continues.  Of course lengthening copyright terms does not necessarily 
encourage public distribution of works.  In some situations it could encourage 
a copyright holder to sit on a work and wait, knowing that the renewed 
copyright protection will prevent others from exploiting the work first. 
 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 
27 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994)). 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 206–07; see also id. at 213 (identifying justifications for concluding 
that CTEA promoted the progress of science). 
 301. Id. at 207 n.14. 
 302. See Dallon, supra note 10, at 447–53 (arguing that CTEA has no significant impact on 
incentives to create works). 
 303. See id. at 442–44 (citing testimony before Congress seeking income for authors’ 
descendants); id. at 443–46 (arguing that increased life expectancy and providing for three 
generations are not valid justification for copyright term extension). 
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The Court further diminished the distinction between the public interest 
and the private interest in another troublesome footnote when it cited testimony 
of the Register of Copyrights.304  The Court stated: 
According to the Register, extending the copyright for existing works 
“could . . . provide additional income that would finance the production and 
publication of new works.”  “Authors would not be able to continue to create,” 
the Register explained, “unless they earned income on their finished works.  
The public benefits not only from an author’s original work but also from his 
or her further creations.”305 
Under this view, anything that puts money in the pockets of copyright 
holders promotes the progress of science.306  This is not accurate.  For many 
extended copyrights, the authors are dead and will not be creating any new 
works regardless of continued revenue to their estates or copyright successors; 
assuring continued payments to George Gershwin’s grandchildren does not 
promote the public interest.  Moreover, for those living authors who continue 
to hold their copyrights, the additional financial value of twenty years tacked 
onto an already lengthy copyright period is likely next to nothing.307  The large 
majority of works do not retain significant economic value for more than fifty 
years from the death of the author, and adding twenty years to the term 
changes nothing for those works.308 
The Court’s private interest-oriented arguments were unnecessary and risk 
eroding the public interest rationale of copyright.  The Court could have 
avoided this problem by adopting the view urged above—that the Copyright 
Clause does not require judicial scrutiny of each copyright amendment for 
compliance with the “to promote” phase so long as the overall copyright 
scheme complies with the requirement.309  Alternatively, the Court should have 
 
 304. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 207–08 n.15. 
 305. Id. at 208 n.15 (citations omitted). 
 306. For example, tax cuts or grants to entertainment companies would “promote the Progress 
of Science.” 
 307. Professor John Belton testified before Congress that corporations making movies and 
television programs “operate on a short-term financial basis” and need to make their money on a 
work within two to five years from release.  Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film 
Preservation Legislation: Hearing on H.R. 989, H.R. 1248, and H.R. 1734 Before the Subcomm. 
on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 286 (1995) 
(statement of John Belton, Professor, Rutgers University, on behalf of the Society for Cinema 
Studies).  “Any profit that it generates after its initial play-off is pure gravy and has little or no 
relation to the initial incentives which led to its production.”  Id.; see also S. Hearings, supra note 
210, at 72 (Professor Peter A. Jaszi stated: “No rational business makes economic decisions about 
present investment based on the mere possibility of income 75 or 100 years in the future.”). 
 308. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 248 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Congressional Research 
Service study finding that only 2% of copyrights between 55 and 75 years old retain commercial 
value). 
 309. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
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maintained that the CTEA itself does promote the progress of science.  Under 
the Copyright Clause and our legal tradition, the public interest and private 
interest are not co-equal interests and never have been.  The private interest is 
only relevant to the extent that it furthers the public interest.  To the extent that 
the CTEA was intended to provide for the grandchildren of now-dead authors, 
a private interest is served, but not a public interest.  However, in the case of 
the CTEA, the Act served both private and public interests.  By harmonizing 
United States copyright law with European Union copyright law, the CTEA 
serves the public interest required by the Copyright Clause; it promotes the 
progress of science by encouraging efficiencies and maintaining the United 
States as a leader in copyright protection.310  This in turn encourages American 
authors to create works in the United States and seek American copyright 
protection.  Retroactive extension of copyrights less clearly promotes the 
progress of science, but seems to be a reasonable adjustment to copyright law, 
internally harmonizing United States copyright terms.  Also, even retroactive 
extensions may serve to encourage authors of future works who sense that 
American copyright law is favorable to authors.  This prevents potential 
authors from shifting their creative efforts to other countries, which might be 
perceived as offering more favorable copyright protections. 
B. Quid Pro Quo: Really? 
The Eldred opinion should not have assumed, for purposes of the opinion, 
the petitioners’ argument that the Copyright Clause “imbeds a quid pro quo” 
applicable to the CTEA.311  The quid pro quo argument was that Congress can 
only grant copyright protection in exchange for a writing by an author.312  By 
assuming the correctness of the proposition, the Court had to stretch to find 
that in fact copyright holders did give something in exchange for retroactive 
term extension.  The Court concluded that when authors of existing works 
created their works, they did so in exchange for both the then-existing 
copyright protection and any future extensions.313  Part of that original bargain 
was a legitimate expectation that the authors—or more aptly their successors—
would be entitled to any future extensions.314  This expectation became part of 
the incentive to authors by virtue of Congress’s “unbroken practice.”315  The 
 
 310. The fact that the CTEA improves the United States’ international trading position also 
serves a public interest, albeit not the public interest envisioned by the Copyright Clause.  The 
public interest purpose of the Copyright Clause requires that copyright law “promote the Progress 
of Science.”  This purpose has nothing to do with the balance of trade between nations, but has to 
do with the advancement of knowledge or the spread of learning. 
 311. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 11, at 23. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 214–15. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. at 215. 
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Court also noted that standard copyright assignment agreements envision such 
possible extensions.316 
The Court’s analysis on this point is not persuasive.  There is nothing 
remotely approaching consideration317 for the retroactive extension.  When an 
author receives copyright protection there is no commitment or expectation of 
any copyright extension.318  Would an author who created a work in 1978 have 
had an expectation that the term of his or her copyright would be extended?  
Does an author who creates a work today have a reasonable expectation that 
his or her copyright term will be extended in the future?  If so, then there 
would be a serious “limited Times” issue with the CTEA and a genuine risk of 
perpetual copyright “on the installment plan.” 
Not only are future extensions generally speculative, but there is no 
requirement or moral imperative that any future term extensions be made 
retroactive.  Whether an extension is retroactive is completely at the discretion 
of Congress.  The Court unwisely suggested that Congress “as a matter of 
unbroken practice” has given authors the equivalent of “an express guarantee 
that authors would receive the benefit of any later legislative extension of the 
copyright term.”319  Prior legislative practices are not binding on future 
congresses320 and no reasonable author could expect otherwise.  When an 
author creates (or “gives”) his or her work, any exchange is for the rights 
afforded under then-existing copyright law.  Whatever additional rights 
Congress thereafter chooses to afford the copyright holder are bonuses and 
separate from the inducement.  The fact that standard copyright assignment 
agreements routinely acknowledge the fortuity of a retroactive legislative 
extension321 indicates only good lawyering in providing broadly for possible 
future events. 
The hope of retroactive term extensions, completely optional at the will of 
Congress, as part of the original inducement for authors is analogous to the 
contract law classic illusory promise.  In contract law, a promise of 
performance may be consideration for a return performance, but a purported 
promise that is optional with the promisor is no promise at all and does not 
 
 316. Id. at 215 n.21. 
 317. The Court uses the word “consideration” in its discussion.  Id. at 214.  The petitioners 
consistently made reference to a required “exchange.”  See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 11, at 
16 n.5, 23. 
 318. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2(1) (1981) (“A promise is a 
manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a 
promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made.”). 
 319. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 215. 
 320. See United States v. Windstar, 518 U.S. 839, 871–73 (1996) (discussing and accepting 
entrenchment doctrine); Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: 
Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 12 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379 (1987) (recognizing and 
discussing rationale for entrenchment doctrine). 
 321. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 215 n.21. 
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constitute consideration.322  The optional retroactive extension is not 
consideration for the work and the work cannot be consideration for a future 
optional extension. 
Instead of reaching to find an exchange, the Court should have held that 
the Copyright Clause does not impose a quid pro quo requirement.  As 
authority for this requirement, the petitioners cited two patent cases: Pennock 
v. Dialogue and Brenner v. Manson.323  Pennock only invoked the “quid pro 
quo” argument in determining the probable intent of Congress under the patent 
act, without reference to construction of the Intellectual Property Clause.324  
Brenner stated that the “quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the 
Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public 
from an invention with substantial utility.”325  But Brenner involved 
interpretation and application language of the patent act, not the limits of 
Congress’s constitutional powers.326  There is no reason to believe that the 
Framers, by the Copyright Clause, intended a quid pro quo analysis for each 
amendment of copyright law. 
C. History of Copyright Extensions 
The Eldred opinion relied heavily upon the “unbroken congressional 
practice” of extending terms of existing copyrights when prospective copyright 
terms are extended.327  Although historical practice is significant, the Court 
may have overstated the argument. 
The historical rationale is twofold.  First, conduct of the earliest congresses 
speaks directly to the meaning of the Constitution.  Second, longstanding 
accepted practices otherwise are entitled to some deference.  The Court 
followed its long line of cases holding that actions of the early congresses 
speak to the meaning of the Constitution and to the intent of the Framers.328  
 
 322. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 cmt. e (1981) (stating that “[w]ords of 
promise which by their terms make performance entirely optional with the ‘promisor’ . . . do not 
constitute a promise”); id. at § 77 (discussing illusory promises). 
 323. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 11, at 8 (citing Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 
1 (1829), and Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966)). 
 324. See Pennock, 27 U.S. at 22–23. 
 325. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534. 
 326. Id.; see also McClurg v. Kinsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202, 206 (1843) (stating that 
retroactive changes to the patent law were valid, noting “the powers of Congress to legislate upon 
the subject of patents is plenary by the terms of the Constitution . . . there can be no limitation of 
their right to modify them at their pleasure”). 
 327. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 200–04 (2003). 
 328. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673–74 (1984) (looking to the conduct of the First 
Congress as evidence of the meaning of Establishment Clause and noting that seventeen 
draftsmen of the Constitution were members of the First Congress); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 
783, 790 (1983) (holding that “historical evidence sheds light not only on what the draftsmen 
intended . . . but also on how they thought that Clause applied to the practice authorized by the 
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Of particular significance is Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,329 
which construed the meaning of “writings” and “authors” of the Copyright 
Clause to include photographs.  The Court interpreted the words of the clause 
in light of the 1790 Act and 1802 amendments to the Act, noting the early 
congresses’ broad view of writings to include maps, charts, etchings, 
engravings, and prints supported a broad interpretation of the Copyright 
Clause.330  The Court repeated the now familiar principle: 
  The construction placed upon the Constitution by the first act of 1790 and 
the act of 1802, by the men who were contemporary with its formation, many 
of whom were members of the convention which framed it, is of itself entitled 
to very great weight, and when it is remembered that the rights thus established 
have not been disputed during a period of nearly a century, it is almost 
conclusive.331 
This principle applies to the First Congress and to other early congresses that 
included members of the founding generation, but cannot claim the same force 
as it concerns later, if now distant, congresses whose members were not 
involved with the framing or ratification of the Constitution.332 
The 1790 Act did not retroactively extend existing copyrights; it created 
for the first time federal copyrights.  Although the 1790 Act does not directly 
 
First Congress—their actions reveal their intent”); Hampton v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 353 
(1928) (explaining that “a contemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution when the 
founders of our government and framers of our Constitution were actively participating in public 
affairs long acquiesced in fixes the construction to be given its provisions”); Myers v. United 
States, 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926) (affirming practice of affording “greatest weight” to 
constitutional interpretation of First Congress); Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 297 
(1888) (holding enactment of First Congress “is contemporaneous and weighty evidence of [the 
Constitution’s] true meaning”); Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803) (holding that 
practice and acquiescence from organization of judiciary fixed the construction of constitutional 
provision); see also Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 681 (1970) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (stating that “[t]he existence from the beginning of the Nation’s life of a practice . . . 
is not conclusive of its constitutionality[, b]ut such practice is a fact of considerable import in the 
interpretation of abstract constitutional language”); United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 
1011–12 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (relying heavily upon practices acquiesced in by the Framers 
in interpreting scope of recess appointment power under the Constitution); James v. Watt, 716 
F.2d 71, 76–77 (1st Cir. 1983) (stating that “[t]he views and actions of the first Congress . . . are 
entitled to considerable weight in cases like this of constitutional interpretation”).  But see Walz, 
397 U.S. at 678 (majority opinion) (explaining that “no one acquires a vested or protected right in 
violation of the Constitution by long use, even when that span of time covers our entire national 
existence and indeed predates it”). 
 329. 111 U.S. 53 (1884). 
 330. Id. at 57–58. 
 331. Id. at 57. 
 332. See Walterscheid, supra note 8, at 339 (arguing that actions of Congress in 1831 do not 
qualify for the great weight afforded to earlier congresses that included members of the founding 
generation).  But see infra notes 341–45 and accompanying text. 
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speak to retroactive copyright extension, it does establish that the First 
Congress did not understand the Constitution to prohibit affording copyright 
protection to existing, published works.333  The 1790 Act undermines the 
Eldred petitioners’ arguments that retroactive term extensions do not promote 
the progress of science and violate a perceived quid pro quo.334 
The first copyright term extension of general application335 occurred in the 
Act of February 3, 1831 (the “1831 Act”).336  The 1831 Act extended the terms 
of existing copyrights to bring them in harmony with the new, longer copyright 
term afforded to new works under the Act.337  Both the 1909 Act338 and the 
1976 Act339 likewise extended the terms of existing copyrights.  The later two 
of these three extensions, however, were not enacted by congresses containing 
Framers, and their constitutional interpretations do not necessarily reflect on 
the Framers’ intent.340 
The Twenty-first Congress, which enacted the 1831 Act, may accurately 
claim familiarity with the Framers’ and Ratifiers’ intentions because it 
contained several members of that generation.  This Congress had twenty-five 
members who were born in 1770 or earlier and would have been sixteen or 
older when the Constitution was written in 1787.341  One of its members, 
Senator Samuel Smith from Maryland, was born in 1752, fought in the 
Revolutionary War, and was thirty-five when the Constitution was written.342  
Congressman John Roane from Virginia, born in 1766, was himself a delegate 
to Virginia’s constitutional convention in 1788.343  Senator James Iredell, Jr., 
 
 333. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 213 n.19 (2003). 
 334. See Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124; 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 151, at 30, 34–36 (explaining that the early authors and the First 
Congress understood the Copyright Clause to grant copyright protection to existing, published 
works). 
 335. Congress did pass two acts continuing the copyright of John Rowlett in a work.  See Act 
of May 24, 1828, ch. 145, 6 Stat. 389; Act of Feb. 11, 1830, ch. 13, 6 Stat. 403. 
 336. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436. 
 337. See id. at ch. 16, § 16. 
 338. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, §§ 23, 24, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080–81. 
 339. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 304, 90 Stat. 2573, 2573–74. 
 340. This history of retroactive extensions may speak to the policies of settled expectations 
and stability. 
 341. See Biographical Directory of the United States Congress 1774–Present, http:// 
bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch1.asp (last visited Oct. 30, 2005); see also 
BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 1774–1989, at 108–10 
(Bicentennial ed., 1989) (listing members of the 21st Congress and publishing their biographies). 
 342. A BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 1774–1989, supra 
note 341, at 1837.  Senator Asher Robbins from Rhode Island who was born in 1757 and 
graduated from Yale in 1782 would have been almost thirty when the Constitution was written.  
Id. at 1723. 
 343. Id. at 1723. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2006] ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE 357 
from North Carolina, was the son of  Justice James Iredell344 who, in addition 
to being an original member of the Supreme Court, was a leading Federalist in 
North Carolina and instrumental in achieving ratification of the Constitution in 
North Carolina.345 
The extensions afforded by these three acts also might be distinguishable 
from the CTEA because each of them involved the repeal of predecessor 
copyright acts and were general copyright law revisions.  They were not 
primarily copyright term extensions.  Each act, as a whole, could be viewed as 
promoting the progress of science and serving the public interest.  The CTEA 
was different; it was not a comprehensive copyright law revision.  Its primary 
purpose was to extend the term of copyrights. 
The view that longstanding practices otherwise should be entitled to 
deference is not persuasive.  Longevity of a practice alone, particularly where a 
constitutional challenge had never before been considered, should not define 
the reach of the Constitution.346  Interpreting the meaning of the Constitution 
based on the conduct of Congress undermines judicial review and diminishes 
the force of the Constitution. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Eldred v. Ashcroft presented a limited question: whether Congress had 
exceeded its constitutional powers by extending the terms of existing 
copyrights.  The case was not about whether a term of the life of an author plus 
seventy years violated the limited times requirement, nor was it about whether 
copyright term extension was prudent.  The Court correctly held that Congress 
did not exceed its constitutional powers.  Applying an originalist or historical 
approach to constitutional interpretation, the Copyright Clause is first and 
foremost a grant of power.  The clause permits Congress, at its discretion, to 
enact laws to create and protect copyright interests and imposes only modest 
limitations on Congress.  These limitations include the originality and limited 
times requirements. 
The phrase “To promote the Progress of Science” should be understood 
broadly to empower Congress to make changes to copyright law that Congress 
rationally believes improve the overall copyright scheme.  The phrase should 
not be understood to impose a test for each germane amendment to copyright 
law.  To the extent that the phrase is viewed as a test for each copyright 
 
 344. WILLIS P. WHICHARD, JUSTICE JAMES IREDELL, at xiv (2000) (noting that James Jr. was 
born in 1788). 
 345. See id. at 45–52 (discussing Iredell’s influence with North Carolina’s delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention and efforts to secure ratification in North Carolina). 
 346. See L. Ray Patterson, What’s Wrong with Eldred?  An Essay on Copyright 
Jurisprudence, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 345, 349 (2003) (criticizing Court’s tactic of using practice 
of Congress to define Constitution rather than measuring practice of Congress against language of 
Constitution). 
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amendment, it should not impose a limited understanding requiring creation or 
publication of new works. 
The Eldred decision, not surprisingly, read the grant of authority under the 
Copyright Clause broadly and afforded Congress great deference to legislate in 
the area of copyrights.  The decision is consistent with the Court’s prior 
copyright cases that indulged in liberal construction of the Copyright Clause 
and allowed Congress substantial latitude to establish copyright policy.  The 
approach also is consistent with the Framers’ view of the appropriate role of 
the courts in reviewing congressional enactments. 
Unfortunately, the decision may be understood by some as demoting the 
public interest rationale for copyrights in favor of a private interest rationale.  
The Court need not have backed away from the public interest rationale, but 
instead should have emphasized how even retroactive extensions would serve 
the public interest. 
The seeming irony of the CTEA’s retroactive copyright term extension is 
that rather than increasing public access to works by encouraging creation or 
publication, instead, the CTEA discouraged publication and dissemination of 
existing, protected works by individuals and entities like the Eldred petitioners.  
Copyright should “increase and not . . . impede the harvest of knowledge,”347 
but Congress reasonably may have believed that retroactive extension created 
an incentive for copyright holders to exploit and publish their works in new 
media and to preserve their works for future exploitation.  Congress also may 
have believed that by maintaining the United States as an international leader 
of copyright protection, creators of future works would be encouraged to create 
works governed by American copyright law rather than opting to create works 
abroad. 
The Court in Eldred should have rejected the position that the Copyright 
Clause requires a “quid pro quo” rather than stretch to find “an exchange”348 
between authors of previously copyrighted works and the United States.  The 
hope of being the beneficiary of possible future copyright extensions is so 
tenuous that it cannot be considered the basis for any exchange.  Nothing in the 
language or history of the Copyright Clause imposes a quid pro quo 
requirement for amendments to copyright law. 
Finally, the Court’s reliance on the “unbroken congressional practice” of 
Congress, while appropriate to a point, is not as compelling as it might first 
appear.  The 1790 Act did not retroactively extend existing copyrights.  The 
other extensions cited by the Court occurred several decades or more after 
ratification of the Constitution.  Particularly, the unchallenged extensions in 
the 1909 and 1976 Acts do not speak to the intentions of the Framers.  The 
1831 Act may have more interpretive significance, but it too was more than 
 
 347. Harper & Row, Pubs., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545 (1985). 
 348. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 214 (2003). 
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four decades removed from the framing and ratification of the Constitution.  
The three major retroactive extensions were temporally separated by many 
decades; they were not frequently recurring events.  Moreover, the CTEA 
could be distinguished from those prior extensions.  It stands alone as an 
amendment to an existing copyright act rather than an extension which was 
part of a comprehensive revision of copyright law. 
The Framers and ratifiers of the Constitution wanted to clarify that 
Congress had the power to grant copyrights, which they believed would be 
good for the United States society and economy.  Had they been faced with the 
opportunity to maximize profits of American copyright holders, improve the 
United States balance of trade, and place the United States on par with 
European copyright protections, there can be little doubt what they would have 
done, even understanding their desire for limited term copyrights.  Any other 
outcome in Eldred would have been contrary to the Copyright Clause as 
defined by the intentions of those who wrote and ratified it and would have 
imposed a policy decision not supported by elected representatives or required 
by the Constitution. 
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